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The ultimate purpose of nuclear power plant safety systems is to prevent damage to the 
reactor and the possible release of radioactive materials into the surroundings following 
an internal or external event that interrupts normal power plant operation. Different de-
sign principles have been developed and they are incorporated to the safety design to 
ensure the safety functions are performed even if some components or whole systems 
fail to function as intended. 
Many nuclear power plant safety systems rely on electrical power to operate. Fol-
lowing a loss of off-site power accident, the power plant electrical systems are supplied 
by the emergency power sources. Station blackout generators constitute an alternative 
source for AC power designed for situations where all the main emergency diesel gen-
erators a fail to function in accident conditions. To introduce diversity into the emergen-
cy power sources, gas turbine generator units are proposed to be used instead of diesel 
generators as station blackout power sources. 
Current nuclear regulations regarding the emergency power generating facilities in a 
nuclear power plants only consider diesel engines for the application. The motivation 
for this research is the absence of a national or a global standard for the design and ac-
ceptance testing of gas turbines in this application. In this thesis the main goal is to de-
termine the requirements for a station blackout gas turbine generator so that it fulfils its 
role in the overall nuclear power plant safety system design. 
The requirement specifications composed as part of this thesis covers the require-
ments for design, operation, maintenance, qualification and testing of the station black-
out emergency power facility including the facility layout, gas turbine engine, generator, 
instrumentation and control systems and auxiliary support systems such as fuel and lu-
brication systems. The decisions behind the technical or quality requirements will be 
explained and discussed to justify the chosen requirements.  
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Ydinvoimalaitosten turvallisuusjärjestelmien perimmäinen tarkoitus on estää reaktorin 
vaurioituminen ja siitä seuraava radioaktiivisten ainesten vapautuminen ympäristöön 
jonkin normaalista käyttötilanteesta poikkeavan ulkoisen tai sisäisen tapahtuman 
johdosta. Ydinturvallisuuden varmistamiseksi on kehitetty erilaisia 
suunnitteluperiaatteita, joilla varmistetaan turvallisuustoiminnon toteutuminen, vaikka 
jotkin turvallisuusjärjestelmät tai -komponentit olisivat epäkunnossa.   
Monet ydinvoimalaitoksen turvallisuusjärjestelmistä tarvitsevat sähkötehoa 
toimiakseen. Tilanteessa, jossa sähkönsyöttö ulkoisesta sähköverkosta menetetään, 
voimalaitoksen sähköjärjestelmiin syötetään sähkötehoa varavoimalähteistä. Station 
Blackout-generaattorit muodostavat vaihtoehtoiset vaihtovirtalähteet, jotka ovat 
suunniteltu sellaisia onnettomuustilanteita varten, joissa ulkoisen verkon menetyksen 
lisäksi ensisijaiset varavoimadieselgeneraattorit eivät toimi. Varavoimalähteiden 
diversiteetin eli erilaisuuden lisäämiseksi kaasuturbiinigeneraattoreita ehdotetaan 
käytettäväksi päädieseleiden lisäksi Station Blackout -generaattoreina.  
Kaikki nykyiset ydinvoimalaitoksen suunnittelua ja käyttöä säännöstelevät ohjeistot 
eli YVL-ohjeet käsittelevät ainoastaan dieselmoottoreita varavoimakoneina. Tämän 
tutkimuksen lähtökohtana ja motiivina on kansallisen tai kansainvälisen kaasuturbiinin 
suunnittelu- ja hyväksytysstandardin puute tässä käyttötarkoituksessa. Tämän 
tutkimuksen päätavoite on kehittää työkalut vaatimusmäärittelyyn, jonka perusteella 
suunniteltu kaasuturbiini voitaisiin hyväksyä ydinturvallisuusluokitelluksi laitteeksi.  
Tämän tutkimuksen ohessa kehitetty vaatimusmäärittely kattaa Station Blackout-
kaasuturbiinin suunnittelun, käytön, huoltamisen, hyväksyttämisen ja testauksen 
sisältäen varavoimalaitoksen layoutin, kaasuturbiinin, generaattorin, säätöjärjestelmät, 
ja apujärjestelmät kuten polttoaine- ja voitelujärjestelmät. Päätökset teknisten 
vaatimusten ja laatuvaatimusten taustalla pyritään esittämään ja perustelemaan 
valittujen vaatimusten pätevyys. 
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Symbols 
A amplitude [m] 
cp specific heat capacity at constant pressure [J/kg·K] 
cv specific heat capacity at constant volume [J/kg·K] 
Ead adiabatic energy [J] 
gc standard gravity [m/s
2
] 
h enthalpy (specific) [J/kg] 
 ̇ mass flow [kg/s] 
n rotational speed [rpm] 
P power; probability [W];[-] 
p pressure [Pa] 
Q heat energy [J] 
qf fuel lower heat value [J/kg] 
s entropy (specific) [J/kg·K] 
T temperature [K] 
U internal energy [J] 
u blade velocity [m/s] 
vθ tangential velocity [m/s] 
W work [J] 
w relative velocity [m/s] 
x displacement [m] 
 ̇ velocity [m/s] 
 ̈ acceleration [m/s2] 
γ specific heat ratio; isentropic constant [-] 
δ infinitesimal change [-] 
Δ differential between states [-] 
η thermal efficiency [-] 
ηc compressor isentropic efficiency [-] 
ηt turbine isentropic efficiency [-] 
ω vibration frequency [1/s] 
π pressure ratio [-] 
Abbreviations 
AC Alternating Current 
AAC Alternative AC source 
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
BWR Boiling Water Reactor 
CDF Core Damage Frequency 
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MCR Main Control Room 
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OL1-4 Olkiluoto Nuclear Units (1-4) 
PRA/PSA Probabilistic Risk/Safety Assessment 
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 
SA Severe Accident 
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SBO Station Blackout 
STUK Säteilyturvakeskus 
TIT Turbine Inlet 
TVO Teollisuuden Voima Oyj 
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply 
 
 
   
9 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern safety design of nuclear power plants is the result of lessons learnt from over 
five decades of operating experiences and the unfortunate severe accidents of Three 
Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. Nuclear authorities 
regulating the nuclear operators update their regulations and guidelines frequently to 
cover all conceivable events endangering safety of nuclear power plants. Principles and 
tools such as Redundancy, Diversity, Separation, Defense-in-Depth, SAHARA and 
PRA are examples of common methods developed and used for improving the safety 
systems design. The goal is to reduce the core damage frequency (CDF), an industry 
standard quantitative measure used by regulators, operators and designers for the safety 
of a nuclear power unit. 
Many safety features of nuclear power plants require alternating current electric 
power to operate. The preferred AC power supply for safety device is the external pow-
er grid, such as the 400 kV national transmission grid in Finland or the auxiliary backup 
110 kV power grid, that are connected to the plant electrical systems. Connection to the 
outside power grid may be lost in several kinds of external or internal events such as 
earthquakes, severe storms or fires inside the power plant. To handle the loss of off-site 
power event, nuclear power plant units are equipped with emergency power generators, 
capable of supplying power to the necessary safety systems for keeping the nuclear re-
actor in safe conditions. 
In the Fukushima accident in March 2011 the nuclear power plant site lost connec-
tion to the outside power grid and multiple nuclear units lost all main emergency diesels 
through a common cause event, an earthquake followed by tsunami. This resulted in a 
condition called station blackout (SBO), which could not be recovered from in time, and 
several units' reactor cores were damaged, and due to hydrogen explosions, radioactive 
materials were released to the surroundings. Newer nuclear power plant designs include 
alternative AC emergency power sources called station blackout generators, which sup-
ply power to critical safety systems in accident conditions. These emergency power 
units present a new layer of defense in the defense-in-depth concept against the station 
blackout event as they are designed to work independently of the main emergency units.  
The use of gas turbine generators as station blackout power sources instead of the 
commonly used diesel generators is proposed by nuclear unit suppliers to bring diversity 
to the safety design of their nuclear units. This thesis research focuses on specifying the 
requirements and developing qualification tests for a gas turbine generator unit, so that 
it can function as a part of the nuclear power plant safety system and qualify as a Safety 
Classified equipment as specified in the Finnish nuclear regulations. To achieve suffi-
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cient reliability, testing procedures of gas turbine engines derived from aircraft propul-
sion application are studied and used to develop a qualification type test for the station 
blackout gas turbine. 
Chapter 2 introduces the specific goals that are set for the research and what meth-
ods are used to approach them. The current standards that are used for qualifying emer-
gency power sources and how their requirements are applied in this thesis are also in-
troduced in this chapter. 
The background of nuclear safety design and the contemporary safety concepts that 
are used while designing new power plants are discussed in chapter 3. The chapter also 
introduces the nuclear authorities that are the active bodies that have been given the 
authority by governments to supervise and license the commercial use of nuclear ener-
gy. The nuclear authority develops regulations that must be followed in the design pro-
cess and operation of a nuclear power plant and also reviews if the safety design choices 
are acceptable.  
The basics of gas turbine design is presented in chapter 4 beginning from the ther-
modynamic background and proceeding into the component-specific choices that are 
available to achieve the desired qualities in the engine. Focal point of this part of the 
research is to determine where decisions can be made to improve the operating reliabil-
ity of the engine and reduce the probability of failures. The long service life time of the 
engine is also of great importance in the application so basic theory for analyzing the 
vibration characteristics of a gas turbine is also presented. 
In chapter 5 the different systems of the emergency power unit (AAC unit) are con-
sidered and the justifications for the specified requirements are presented. The bases of 
the choices are explained, mainly through the nuclear regulations and legislation in Fin-
land and the internationally accepted standards that are used by the nuclear industry. 
Gas turbine qualification testing is a major part of the process in achieving safety classi-
fication for the gas turbine engine type and the basic scope of the type test is also pre-
sented. Requirements for the control systems of the gas turbine and the whole emergen-
cy unit are also considered as well as the operational and maintenance requirements that 
need to be set for the AAC facility. 
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2. RESEARCH SCOPE  
2.1. Research Objective and Methods 
The objective of this thesis research is to establish requirements for a gas turbine engine 
to function as a nuclear power plant emergency power supply. The requirement specifi-
cations are developed as part of the licensing feasibility studies (LFS) of the nuclear unit 
designs in the Olkiluoto 4 project. The application of gas turbines for emergency power 
source operation is a relatively new in the nuclear industry, where diesel generators 
have been the standard choice for decades. The main driving design criteria in the re-
quirement specification are high reliability and availability of the facility and ease of 
maintenance so the desired life-time of the unit can be achieved. 
This thesis research involves examining different standards, which are the bases of 
nuclear power plant design and qualification process of the nuclear safety equipment. 
The relevant standards and regulations for the safety system studied in this thesis consist 
of various fields such as control systems, quality management of the engine and compo-
nent production, measurement device and methods, safety design principles and certifi-
cation testing protocols. Finding the right combination of requirements from the stand-
ards and nuclear regulations is a vital part of the process of specifying justified require-
ments. The goal is to develop such requirements that they are unambiguous, so there 
remains no room for misinterpretation, but at the same time the actual design choices 
are left for designer. 
A common requirement for any safety system for nuclear power plants is that the 
system and all devices related to its safety function have shown high reliability when 
used in similar conditions elsewhere in nuclear power plants. In rare cases operating 
experience gathered in other industrial applications are used if better experience is not 
available and the industrial experience is deemed sufficiently reliable. A great challenge 
in specifying the requirements for a gas turbine generator as an emergency power 
source for a nuclear power plant is the lack of a globally accepted standard for the de-
sign of gas turbines used in this application. The only type test for gas turbine qualifica-
tion for emergency power supply in a nuclear power plant has been performed by 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 2010 to be accepted in their US-APWR plant design. 
(Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 2010) 
The introduction of a gas turbine engine to a relatively new application requires 
combining current knowledge on gas turbines with some new improvements. The basic 
thermodynamics handbooks provide useful tools for evaluating the performance limita-
tions of gas turbines and gas turbine engineering handbooks are used to evaluate differ-
ent component choices available in modern gas turbines. Especially important for meet-
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ing the safety requirements as a part of the nuclear unit safety analysis is the reliability, 
availability and service life of the gas turbine, so the research on improving these char-
acteristics in a gas turbine are studied. For example articles and studies concerning vi-
bration analyzes on rotating machinery and development of new materials are useful in 
this research because the latest knowledge on these subjects provides the limits that are 
achievable in contemporary gas turbine designs. 
2.2. Nuclear Regulations and Standards  
The requirements for the design and operation of nuclear power plants are included in 
multiple levels of rules. The basic hierarchy for applying the different requirements to 
design process is presented in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of rules to be applied in nuclear safety design 
On the highest level on the hierarchy are the laws and governmental decrees, which 
define the general principles that need to be followed in the design and operation of a 
nuclear power plant. On the next level are the regulatory guides that give more detailed 
technical requirements for systems and components but generally do not specify how 
they must be achieved. Nuclear standards are the generally accepted design standards 
for components and systems that are critical for nuclear safety. On the lowest level are 
the conventional standards that are generally approved by other industry and they can be 
used for non-safety systems and components. 
To meet the quality and reliability requirements of the nuclear regulations, the de-
sign of all components and systems in the nuclear power plants must follow strict guide-
lines presented in their respective standards.  Following the standards ensures that dif-
ferent equipment and systems can be compared with each other and trusted to perform 
their intended function and qualified as Safety Classified systems and equipment. 
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YVL guides are the regulatory guides that regulate the design and operation of 
Finnish nuclear power plants. Currently the YVL guides are under a revision process to 
renew and update the guidelines to better incorporate the current knowledge of nuclear 
safety. The current YVL 5.1 guide that regulates the emergency power generating facili-
ties refer to the German nuclear Standard KTA 3702:2000 "Emergency Power Generat-
ing Facilities with Diesel-Generator Units in Nuclear Power Plants" for technical re-
quirements of Diesel engines and emergency power facilities. A lot of the qualities of an 
emergency power unit are independent of the actual engine that produces the driving 
force for the generator, so the KTA 3702:2000 standard forms a solid base for specify-
ing requirements for the station blackout facility. Due to the extensive use of this stand-
ard, it will be referred to only as KTA 3702 later in this thesis. 
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has given the requirements for en-
gines used in commercial airplanes in the standard called "Certification Specifications 
for Engines" (EASA 2010), which will be abbreviated and referred as CS-E in this the-
sis. The qualification test programs presented in the standard for airplane gas turbine 
engines are rigorous and high reliability is required for the critical engine parts to ensure 
safe flight. The aircraft engines are also required to function in very wide operating 
ranges and harsh ambient conditions, which is also desirable for the emergency power 
source application. For this reason the CS-E standard is a good source for information 
about the testing of gas turbine engines' reliability, which can also be partly adopted for 
the testing programs for gas turbines meant for land-based power generation. Industrial 
gas turbine performance testing is standardized by American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers in ASME PTC 22 "Performance Test Code on Gas Turbines" (2005) and by 
International Organization of Standardization in ISO 2314 "Gas Turbines - Acceptance 
Test" (2009). These conventional standards are used as reference in addition to the KTA 
3702 standard to develop performance testing guideline for the nuclear power plant sta-
tion blackout gas turbine. 
Other relevant standards that will be studied for the requirement specification in-
clude for example: electrical standards for the generator and other electrical compo-
nents, mechanical standards for gas turbine performance calculations, measurement 
standards for vibrations and quality assurance programs for component manufacturing. 
In addition to the regulations and standards, some general requirements for the 
AAC facility and auxiliary systems were adopted from European Utility Requirements 
(EUR), which is a program of major European electricity generation companies that 
strive to harmonize their requirements for the design bases of Light Water Reactors 
(LWR) to be built in Europe. 
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3. SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
3.1. Nuclear Safety Authorities 
The peaceful use of nuclear energy is governed by organizations that have been given 
the authority to regulate the nuclear operators by their governments. The organizations 
responsible for nuclear safety have multiple missions such as maintaining nuclear safety 
regulations and legislations, developing standards and granting licenses for commercial 
companies for electrical power generation.  
The national and global nuclear safety authorities work with each other and together 
with the nuclear industry to make sure all regulations are kept up to date and followed 
by the nuclear operators in order to produce safe nuclear energy. (IAEA 1956) 
3.1.1. International Atomic Energy Agency 
The leading global nuclear safety authority is the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which was founded in 1957 within United Nations. The IAEA works with its 
member states to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy. According to IAEA's Statute 
(IAEA 1956), its functions are: supporting the research on radiation effects and behav-
ior of radionuclides in the environment, promoting information exchange through scien-
tific publications and meetings, establishing standards, regulations and guides dealing 
with nuclear fuel cycle and radioactive waste management, helping member states de-
velop infrastructure for nuclear safety and providing advice for them, promoting binding 
international conventions on nuclear safety. One notable example of IAEA's functions is 
to make sure all fissile material is accounted for and remains in authorized hands for 
power generating purposes only (IAEA 2005). One of the methods used by the IAEA is 
to monitor all nuclear reactors under their authority to make sure that nuclear fuel is not 
removed from the reactors without proper authorization and documentation.  
IAEA has also developed a classification system (IAEA 1989) for nuclear events 
called INES (The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale) that is based on 
the severity and consequences of the event. The scale was first introduced in 1989 and 
its purpose is to communicate the technical aspects of the events to the public and make 
different kinds of accident events comparable. The INES scale consists of event classes 
from 1 to 7, where the classes 1 to 3 are defined as incidents and 4 to 7 as accidents. The 
evaluation is based on the severity and consequences of the event. The two accidents in 
history that have been given the highest rating of 7 on the INES scale are the Chernobyl 
accident in 1986 and Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 which both involved severe 
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reactor core damage that lead to large uncontrolled release of radioactive materials to 
the environment. 
The highest incidents on the INES scale in Finnish nuclear power plants have been 
rated INES 2, only two of them after the scale was introduced, the other five cases have 
been rated afterwards. The two cases were the following events: in 1991 Olkiluoto 2 
unit lost connection to outside grid due to a fire, in 1993 Loviisa 2 unit had a feedwater 
pipe break in the secondary circuit due to erosion/corrosion. The safety systems worked 
as intended in both situations, so these cases remained as operating incidents instead of 
escalating to accidents. (Isolankila et al. 2004) 
3.1.2. Finnish Nuclear Authority 
The national nuclear regulatory body in Finland is the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority STUK, which is an abbreviation of the Finnish name Säteilytur-
vakeskus. STUK is under the administration of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health and regulates the use of nuclear energy in Finland according to the Finnish Radi-
ation Act (L 592/1991) and Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(VNA 733/2008).  
STUK develops regulations for nuclear operators in Finland called the YVL guides. 
These guides provide requirements, technical as well as organizational, that the nuclear 
operator must comply with to maintain their operator license. The regulations are updat-
ed when knowledge is gained from events and operating experiences from around the 
world and if new improvements in nuclear safety designs are deemed necessary for new 
power plants. STUK works together with the nuclear operators in Finland and performs 
inspections on the operating plants and nuclear power plant construction sites to ensure 
that the regulations are being followed accordingly. The YVL guides are currently un-
der a revision process as this thesis is written and some information is used from the 
draft versions that might be revised later. 
A major area of responsibility of STUK is also to handle the licensing process of 
new nuclear reactors in Finland. All design documents, certificates and quality control 
material related to the safety of the new power plant goes through an accepting process 
in STUK and possible issues with the design must be addressed by the supplier of the 
plant. The design and manufacturing, as well as installation and commissioning at the 
final plant site, of all systems and components relevant for the safety of the plant is sub-
jected for review by STUK. 
3.2. Modern Safety Design 
Safety design of nuclear power plants is based on the legislation, regulations and guide-
lines provided for the nuclear industry by the nuclear authorities. The greatest nuclear 
accidents of the Three Mile Island reactor meltdown in 1979, the Chernobyl reactor core 
explosion and resulting fire of the graphite moderator in 1986 and the Fukushima loss-
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of-off-site power following an earthquake and a tsunami in 2011 and their accident ana-
lyzes (Corey 1979, IAEA 1992, TEPCO 2012) have taught important lessons regarding 
the safety design and safe operation of a nuclear power plant. These lessons are now 
incorporated in regulations in hopes that similar accidents could be avoided in the fu-
ture. A few of the most common principles required by the laws and regulations for the 
design of nuclear safety are: defense-in-depth, successive physical containment barriers, 
separation, diversity and redundancy (Isolankila et al. 2004). A short description of 
these important principles is provided in this chapter to support the discussion of the 
role of the gas turbine in the safety functions later in the thesis. 
The concept of defense-in-depth is used to design safety systems so that the nuclear 
unit can handle different operating conditions from the normal operation and design 
basis conditions to the severe accidents. The safety systems constitute 5 subsequent lev-
els of defense that should prevent any operating condition from escalating further into 
accidents. First level consists of systems for normal operation, the second level holds 
the systems for the design basis conditions, the third level systems are for accidents, the 
fourth level consist of severe accident handling systems and finally on the fifth level is 
the preventive measures for exposure of the public to radioactive release. The systems 
in the subsequent layers should be independent such that failures in different levels of 
safety systems should not produce failures in other levels. (IAEA 1996, Isolankila et al. 
2004) 
The redundancy principle means that there are multiple independent components or 
whole safety subsystems performing the same function. Redundant components or sys-
tems can individually perform their intended function and are designed to be both phys-
ically and functionally separate from each other according to the separation principle. 
The goal of this separation is to increase the overall safety of the plant by making the 
systems more immune to common-cause failures such as fires or electrical faults that 
would incapacitate all of the safety systems and prevent their function which could po-
tentially cause a severe nuclear accident. As required by the VNA 773/2008, the most 
important electrical and automation safety plants comply with the so called N+2 criteri-
on, which can be achieved with 4 redundant safety subsystems, with 2 of them capable 
of driving the plant into safe state while 1 system is under maintenance and 1 system 
fails. On the other hand the N+2 criterion means that one faulty signal will not cause 
unnecessary initiation of safety function. 
Another important safety concept used in the safety systems design is the diversity 
principle. Diversity between systems means that there are different mechanisms for per-
forming similar safety functions. The strength of this concept is that a single event is 
unlikely to cause failure of the diverse systems because of the differences in their na-
ture. This ensures that the desired safety function is performed by either one of the di-
verse systems. A case example of applying diversity principle in a Boiling Water Reac-
tor (BWR) nuclear power plant is having both electrical emergency feed-water pumps 
and steam-turbine pumps which use the steam generated by the reactor in emergency 
operation. Having these diversely functioning pumps ensures that the coolant flow 
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through the reactor core and the removal of residual heat from the nuclear fuel is main-
tained even if electrical power is lost from the power plant safety systems. Similarly, the 
choice of a gas turbine generator instead of the normal diesel generator combination can 
be seen as an improvement to the diversity of the emergency electrical systems as the 
engines have many diverse functions. (Isolankila et al. 2004) 
3.2.1. Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Probabilistic Risk/Safety Assessment (PRA/PSA) is an engineering safety analysis tool 
for evaluating complex systems such as airliners, space shuttles or most importantly, 
nuclear power plant safety. The total risk for an event is evaluated by statistical methods 
the magnitude of its consequences stated numerically by some important quantitative 
measure, and the frequency of occurrence for the risk. The quantifying measure could 
for example be number of lives lost or total radioactive material released to the sur-
roundings. The total risk of an event is the expected loss calculated by multiplying the 
quantified consequence with the probability of the event. (Isolankila et al. 2004) 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment was first introduced to the nuclear industry by the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1975, and significantly expanded the 
research on the subject after the Three Mile Island incident in 1979. This lead to the 
publication of NRC Fault Tree Handbook (NRC 1981) and the PRA soon became man-
datory for operators under the NRC regulatory authority. The PRA combines Fault Tree 
and Event Tree Analyses (FTA/ETA), where an initiating event is assumed and its con-
sequences in a system is systematically analyzed. Performing the Fault Tree Analysis 
has a standardized procedure in IEC 61025:2006. The initiating event can for example 
be a failure of a single component in the process followed by failures on the system lev-
el.  
The possibility of failures propagating further in the fault tree can be reduced by 
implementing multiple parallel components to individual steps as shown in Figure 3.1,  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Reliability of a system with redundant components 
where the numbers inside the blocks indicate the probability that the individual system 
performs its function. The total output probability   of this system can be calculated 
from 
         (      )   (Eq. 3.1) 
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which gives a probability of 0.989992. This shows the redundancy principle in effect in 
a simplified example. The PRA calculations used in nuclear power plants form much 
more complex systems and event chains that are analyzed but the output is also a proba-
bilistic value. 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is an important tool in quality engineer-
ing and the method is also standardized by International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC 60812:2006). FMEA is used for determining what kind of failures can occur in an 
individual component or part of a system and what the consequences of the failures are. 
The FMEA provides input data for the reliability calculations for determining the prob-
ability of the risk.  
The most critical views of the PRA method claim that it is incapable of predicting 
human errors and that it is poor for representing complex systems such as a nuclear 
power plant safety system, or a space shuttle where all the failure modes are not known,  
as studied by Marais et al. (2004). Ramana (2011) claims that in the Fukushima acci-
dent the PRA did not fully cover the possibility of a tsunami-earthquake combination 
that could cause a common failure of the emergency power supplies and that many 
faults in analyzes were ignored or faults recognized were not taken care of (TEPCO 
2012). These accidents caused by common-cause failures are so-called beyond design 
basis accidents that have not been accounted for in some PRA analyzes.  
Despite its criticism, the PRA is the main tool used for analyzing and evaluating 
nuclear power plant safety in the design process and during operation of the unit. The 
nuclear unit suppliers, operators and regulators all use the PRA for evaluating the com-
plex safety system of a nuclear power plant. The process of developing a PRA for a 
nuclear unit includes many choices whether to include some risks in the analysis or not, 
and as such the resulting core damage frequencies (CDF) for different nuclear power 
plant types cannot be compared with one another Some PRA analyzes for example do 
not include initiating events during refueling outages and instead only cover the events 
during power generating operation. This choice immediately changes the output of the 
PRA drastically as many initiating events are ignored and left out of the risk calculation. 
(Isolankila et al. 2004) 
Modern power plants can for example have design limit values for cumulative fre-
quencies of less than 10
-5
 / year for reactor core damage and less than 5·10
-7
 / year for 
release exceeding 100 TBq of cesium-137 after a severe accident according to YVL B.1 
draft 2 (2012). These frequencies show that the events are highly unlikely in the scope 
of the 60 year operating life-time of a nuclear power plant. 
3.2.2. Operating Condition Classification 
During power generating operation of a nuclear power plant, deviations from normal 
plant operating conditions are bound to be encountered.  A deviation in the process val-
ues or failures in the safety equipment or an external event can cause abnormal plant 
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conditions so that safety actions from either the control system or manual operation 
from the power plant operators is required.  
Different operating conditions are divided into subgroups called design categories 
according to their occurrence frequencies and the severity of their consequences. Table 
3-1 shows the different design categories as they are presented in draft 2 of YVL B.1 
guide. The frequencies in the Table 3-1 are stated as probability P of occurrence during 
a year of operation.  
Table 3-1: Definitions of operating conditions (YVL B.1 draft 2) 
Defense-
in-depth 
level 
Plant condition cate-
gory 
Frequency Design 
category 
Upper limits of 
radiological 
consequences 
Level 1 Normal operation  DBC 1 0,1 mSv / year 
Level 2 Anticipated event 10
-2
 / year < P DBC 2 0,1 mSv/ year 
Level 3a Accident initiated by 
single event 
- Class 1 
- Class 2 
 
 
10
-3
 /y < P < 10
-2
 / y 
P < 10
-3
 /y 
 
 
DBC 3 
DBC 4 
 
 
1 mSv  / event 
5 mSv  / event 
Level 3b Type A: anticipated 
event or Class 1 ac-
cident with common 
cause failure of a 
safety system 
 
Type B: multiple 
failure event 
 
Type C: rare event 
 
 
 
 
 
10
-7
 / y < P < 10
-4
 / y 
 
 
 
 
 
DEC 
 
 
 
 
 
20 mSv / event 
Level 4 Severe Accident 
 
 
P < 10
-5
 / year 
 
SA 
 Cs-137 release 
< 100 TBq 
3.2.3. Postulated Accidents 
Postulated accidents are used as bases of the design of safety systems of a nuclear unit 
using deterministic approach to analyze how an accident sequence propagates and what 
is required to stop it. The commonly analyzed postulated accidents presented here are 
the Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCA) and the Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP). Nor-
mally the safety systems of the nuclear unit are able to handle these accident events and 
they remain in the DBC 2-4 categories. A common cause failure (CCF) of the main 
emergency diesel generators or their related safety systems, possibly coinciding with a 
DBC 2 or DBC 3 condition, is classified as DEC or SA.  
The Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) condition is normally used 
in the western Light Water Reactors (LWR) for the design basis of emergency cooling 
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systems of the reactor. The LBLOCA conditions varies somewhat between Boiling Wa-
ter Reactors (BWR) and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR): in BWR it results from a 
complete cut-off of a main steam pipeline, where in PWR the worst condition is caused 
by a pipe break in the cool side of the primary circuit. In the LBLOCA condition the 
reactor coolant needs to be quickly added to the reactor and circulated continuously to 
prevent fuel rods from becoming exposed and resulting in damage to the nuclear fuel. 
The LBLOCA causes the pressure of the reactor to drop rapidly in BWRs so that pump-
ing coolant back into the reactor is easier than in the PWR where a large amount of 
coolant is evaporated quickly and the pressure remains high in comparison. This makes 
LBLOCA a slightly worse condition for the PWRs as the coolant needs to be pumped 
against a lot greater pressure, and so separate high pressure emergency coolant tanks are 
needed initially. (Eurasto et al. 2004, Pöllänen et al. 2004) 
Another type of postulated accident that has potential to cause a Severe Accident is 
the loss of electrical power from the safety systems. If the reactor coolant is not contin-
uously circulated in the reactor, the residual heat generation of the nuclear fuel decay 
begins to increase the pressure in the primary circuit and the coolant is blown away to 
maintain the pressure level. In this condition, the coolant is lost a lot slower than in 
LBLOCA, but the electric power needs to be restored to the unit or the eventually this 
condition leads to fuel damage and a Severe Accident. The time required for the restora-
tion of AC power depends on the reactor type: for example the VVER type reactors in 
Loviisa require AC power after 4 hours. (Pöllänen et al. 2004) 
3.2.4. Safety Classification of Equipment and Systems 
Safety systems, structures and equipment in nuclear power plants are designated into 
groups based on the consequences of their failure to accomplish their tasks. The follow-
ing definitions of Safety Classes are presented in the YVL B.2 draft 4 "Safety classifica-
tion of systems, structures and components in nuclear facilities": 
 
(317) Safety Class 1 shall include nuclear fuel as well as structures and 
components whose rupture could result in an accident compromising reactor 
integrity and requiring immediate actuation of safety functions. Safety Class 1 
specifically includes the reactor pressure vessel and those components of the 
primary circuit whose rupture results in a primary circuit leak that cannot be 
compensated for by systems pertaining to normal plant operation. 
 
(314) Systems shall be assigned to Safety Class 2 if they are designed to 
provide protection against postulated accidents by bringing the facility to a con-
trolled state and by maintaining this state for as long as the prerequisites for a 
transfer to a safe state can be ensured. 
 
(315) Safety Class 3 shall include systems that 
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1. mitigate the consequences of operational disturbances, unless they 
are assigned to a higher safety class for some other reason 
2. accomplish the diversity principle and are designed to ensure bring-
ing of the facility into a controlled state in case the systems primarily 
taking care of the corresponding safety function fail 
3. are designed to bring the facility into a safe state over a long period 
of time 
4. are designed for the reactor main control functions (control of power, 
pressure, or make-up water supply) and which, in case of failure, ini-
tiate Safety Class 2 safety functions 
5. relate to fuel handling and may, in case of their failure, cause fuel 
damage 
6. are stationary and contribute to the monitoring of radiation level in the 
nuclear power plant’s rooms, radioactivity monitoring of plant pro-
cesses or the activity concentration of releases 
7. are designed to cool spent fuel 
8. are designed for severe accident management 
9. prevent the spreading of radioactive substances in spaces that are 
outside the containment 
10. are essential for the maintenance of control room habitability. 
 
Safety Class 1 equipment handle the normal operation conditions (DBC 1) as presented 
in Table 3-1, Safety Class 2 equipment perform safety functions required in Design Ba-
sis Conditions 2 to 4 and Safety Class 3 equipment are designed to function in DEC and 
SA conditions. Class EYT equipment are those that are defined non-safety, meaning 
that their failure has no nuclear safety consequences. 
Considering the qualification of a system or component as a Safety Classified, the 
YVL B.2 draft 4 states the following: 
  
(307) The quality requirements for systems, structures and components as 
well as the requirements for quality assurance shall be so defined that the re-
quirement level is higher in a higher safety class. The requirements shall focus 
on matters affecting the reliability of safety functions: verification of the structur-
al integrity of structures and components as well as the operational reliability of 
systems. The requirements shall, for applicable parts, cover the design, manu-
facture, construction, installation, inspection and actions during operation of the 
classified item. In the requirement specification, standards applicable to the item 
in question shall be used. 
 
This statement provides the main criteria that are needed for the acceptance process for 
safety classified systems, most important being the reliability verification and especially 
defining the applicable standards in requirement specification. 
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3.3. Electrical Systems of Nuclear Power Plants 
Many of the safety functions in nuclear power plants are performed by electrical equip-
ment such as pumps, blowers, actuators or lighting and ventilation that need alternating 
current power to operate. During normal operation of the nuclear power plant, part of 
the electrical power the plant generates is used by the plant itself to operate the electri-
cal systems.  For the event where the connections to the external transmission power 
grid and the possible auxiliary standby power grid are lost, the nuclear power unit is 
equipped with multiple redundant emergency power generating units to supply power 
for the safety device, so the unit can be safely operated and driven into safe state. (IAEA 
2004) 
These safety systems including the power generating units and the safety equipment 
and systems supplied by them are classified according to their intended safety functions 
as either Safety Class 2 or Safety Class 3 as specified in the YVL B.2 guide. A simpli-
fied (only 2 subdivisions are shown) example of the general design of nuclear power 
plant electrical system including the emergency power sources and different loads con-
nected to them, electrical system configuration diagram of a nuclear power unit is pre-
sented in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Configuration of emergency power sources (modified from IAEA 2004) 
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In Figure 3.2 the electrical system of the nuclear power plant consists of 2 outside 
sources: the main grid and alternative transmission line, and the emergency diesel gen-
erators followed by the dedicated emergency systems and may also include additional 
power supply sources. Figure 3.3 shows the power sources available in the OL1 and 
OL2 nuclear units. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Electrical power sources in the OL1/OL2 nuclear units 
The plant electrical systems consist of multiple different voltage trains to better serve 
equipment of different power levels. For example the OL1 and OL2 AC power systems 
have the following voltage trains: 6.6 kV, 660 V, 380 V and 220 V. During normal op-
eration the electrical system is supplied power by the generator or the outside power 
grid first to the 6.6 kV train and progressively to lower voltage levels with transformers. 
The lower voltage level trains are supplied with the emergency power sources if the 
feed from the 6.6 kV train is lost. The diesel generator of course requires some time 
before it can supply the safety train (start-up and power sequencing), so those equip-
ment that cannot handle the power loss are additionally powered by Uninterrupted Pow-
er Supplies (UPS). 
The electrical system of the newer nuclear unit of OL3 differs from the older units, 
for example in the voltage levels. Figure 3.4 shows an extremely simplified diagram of 
the configuration of electrical systems of the OL3 nuclear unit showing only a single 
safety division.  
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Figure 3.4: Simplified example of the OL3 electrical system (TVO 2010, p. 50) 
The single subdivision of the OL3 electrical system shown in Figure 3.4 includes the 
voltage levels of 10 kV, 690 V and 400 V, with the emergency diesels connected to the 
10 kV train. Notable difference to the OL1/2 system is the SBO diesels that are con-
nected to the 690 V train providing an alternative on-site AC source. 
3.3.1. Main Emergency Power Units 
The nuclear unit electrical systems are commonly designed such that the main emergen-
cy units are connected to the safety system power trains and receive a start-up signal 
automatically following a sufficiently large voltage disturbance in the connection to 
external power sources. The main emergency units, all auxiliary components vital for 
their function and the power trains they supply are classified as Safety Class 2 equip-
ment in YVL B.2 draft 4. This classification means that the emergency power units shall 
supply power to the nuclear power plant safety system in DBC 3 and 4 events as ex-
plained in Table 3-1.   
The Safety Class 2 main Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) supply AC power to 
the designated safety trains for as long as needed until the connection to the outside grid 
is restored, the engine malfunctions, or uses up all fuel or other operating media storage 
reserves. The necessary duration for the continuous function of the emergency power 
sources must be evaluated in the design phase and should be based on the analysis of the 
events that can cut the connection to outside grid and how long it should take to re-
establish connection. (IAEA 2004) 
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The design of the main emergency power systems follows, as required by VNA 
733/2008, 14 §, the N+2 Criterion. This requirement can be met with either 3 independ-
ent trains with 100 % capacity or with 4 independent trains of safety equipment with 50 
% capacity as in the OL1 and OL2 units as shown in Figure 3.2 (subdivisions 
A,B,C,D). Both of these systems ensure that the safety function is performed even if one 
train is unavailable due to maintenance and one system fails to operate due to a single 
failure. The advantage of the 4·50% system is that a single faulty signal will not cause 
activation of safety functions. 
The normal power requirement of a safety train in a modern nuclear power plant is 
from 3 to 10 MW. This gives an indication of what size of an engine and generator is 
needed for emergency power generation. For example, the main emergency power 
trains in the OL3 power plant, which is of the Areva-Siemens EPR design, are powered 
by 7.8 MVA EDGs. The OL1 and OL2 have slightly smaller diesel engines, with 1.79 
MW rated power and they supply the 660 V, 380 V and 220 V trains. 
3.3.2. Alternative AC Units 
Alternative AC (AAC) unit is a facility that constitutes an alternative source for AC 
power to the nuclear power plant in case of loss of off-site power (LOOP) event coinci-
dent with failure of the main emergency power units. The station blackout (SBO) condi-
tion and the need of AAC units to protect the nuclear power plants in this condition 
have been evaluated for example by the U.S. nuclear regulator NRC (Eide et al. 2005). 
In the study, the improvements in the core meltdown frequency of the PRA calculations 
were evaluated for over a 100 nuclear power plants and concluded that the improve-
ments were significant. 
The AAC unit, all safety loads it supplies power to, all auxiliary components rele-
vant for its emergency power generating operation and the control systems are classified 
as Safety Class 3 equipment in the YVL B.2 draft 4. The systems powered by the AAC 
units are designed to perform safety functions in the Design Extension Condition (DEC) 
and Severe Accident (SA) conditions meaning that they are the next level of defense 
after the main EDGs. The AAC systems are not used in DBC 3 and 4 conditions, which 
are normally handled by the Safety Class 2 equipment.  
The Safety Class 3 systems are connected to the Safety Class 2 electrical systems in 
such way that the lower class system may not cause failure in the higher class safety 
systems, which holds true in every case where equipment of different classes have a 
connection according to the YVL B.2 draft version 4. The AAC units are required to 
fulfill the N+1 Criterion, which means that 1 unit with 100 % capacity is available for 
emergency operation at all times. This requirement naturally means that at least 2 inde-
pendent AAC unit need to be designed for the nuclear unit as one of the units has to 
remain functional while the other is out of operation due to maintenance or a single fail-
ure. 
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Careful consideration is needed when designing the physical and electrical layout of 
the whole nuclear power plant unit. According to the separation and redundancy princi-
ples the AAC units should be separated functionally and physically from both the main 
emergency power sources and each other. The separation should be extended to im-
portant auxiliary systems the fuel lines and cabling to ensure that all of the power 
sources are unlikely to be cut off or damaged by a single event such as a storm or an 
earthquake, or a fire inside the nuclear unit. (IAEA 2004) 
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4. FUNDAMENTALS OF GAS TURBINE DESIGN 
4.1. Thermodynamics of Gas Turbines 
The analysis of the performance and characteristics of gas turbines requires understand-
ing of basic thermodynamic concepts. The laws of thermodynamics and flow dynamics 
equations give boundaries of what performance can be achieved with the different de-
sign solutions and how different conditions affect the performance and reliability of a 
gas turbine. (Çengel & Boles 2007, Boyce 2012) 
Conservation of energy is a fundamental quality of nature and thus represented in 
the first law of thermodynamics, which was first postulated by Rudolf Clausius in 1850 
in his paper "On the mechanical theory of heat" (Clausius 1850; via van Voorst 1870) in 
two different ways. The first one referred to the cyclic nature of the law and the other 
one to the incremental nature of the law and both of them are equally true. The first law 
of thermodynamics can be represented in equation form in following manner: 
 
                  (Eq. 4.1) 
 
which states that the change in the internal energy    of a closed system is the sum of 
the heat energy    transferred through the system boundaries and the work done on the 
system boundaries   . If there is no change of internal energy present, the complete 
amount of heat brought to the system could be extracted as work. The first law of ther-
modynamics introduces the concept of internal energy but does not account for the di-
rection of progress of the natural processes. Essentially the first law states that energy 
never dissipates in a process, it just changes form to another. (Çengel & Boles 2007) 
The second law of thermodynamics introduces another physical property called en-
tropy to explain the natural direction of processes. In ideal, reversible processes, the 
change of entropy is zero. In all real thermodynamic processes involving finite tempera-
ture differences, the change of entropy is positive. This means that all real processes are 
irreversible and entropy increases. Mathematically this can be expressed as  
 
     
  
 
    (Eq. 4.2) 
 
where    is the infinitesimal change of entropy,    is the infinitesimal change of heat 
in the process,   is the equilibrium temperature. Adiabatic process means that no heat 
energy leaves or enters the closed system; however there is still some degree of irrevers-
ibility from friction or other sources. Ideal, reversible adiabatic process is called isen-
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tropic, where    equals zero. Reversibility can never be totally achieved in real pro-
cesses and adjustments have to be made on the ideal process analyses and calculations 
to accommodate the unavoidable losses. (Çengel & Boles 2007) 
Gas turbine is a heat engine that operates in a thermodynamic cycle called the Bray-
ton cycle, named after its founder George Brayton (1830-1892). Originally Brayton 
utilized the thermodynamic cycle in a piston engine but its contemporary use is widely 
in gas turbine applications. Most of contemporary gas turbines operate on an actual 
open Brayton cycle using air as working fluid and a fossil fuel for heat addition in the 
combustor.  
Closed Brayton cycle engines have their uses and they are being developed for var-
ious new concepts in power generation. An example of a closed cycle gas turbine con-
cept is the helium gas turbine, where helium gas is heated up with nuclear fission and 
the power is extracted from the process in a gas turbine (Beck et al. 2010). The closed 
cycle gas turbines will be excluded from further analysis in this thesis as they are highly 
unlikely and unfitting choices for the application at hand. 
The ideal and actual Brayton cycles are presented in T,s -diagram in Figure 4.1. 
The states (1, 2, 3, 4) form the ideal cycle and states (1, 2', 3', 4') form the actual cycle. 
 
Figure 4.1: Ideal and actual Brayton cycles 
and it consists of four processes: (1-2) isentropic compression of the working fluid, (2-
3) isobaric heat addition, (3-4) isentropic expansion of the working fluid, (4-1) isobaric 
heat rejection.  
In the actual Brayton cycle, as presented in Figure 4.1, the working fluid air comes 
into step (1) slightly below atmospheric pressure resulting from air inlet duct pressure 
losses. The compression of the air between states (1) and (2') is performed by the com-
pressor. The heat addition process is achieved in the combustor between states (2') and 
(3') with minor pressure losses. Finally the air is expanded in the turbine between (3') 
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and (4') and the exhaust gases are released into the atmosphere slightly above atmos-
pheric pressure. A simple schematic flow diagram of the gas turbine components and 
corresponding steps are presented in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Open-cycle gas turbine process 
The total work output of the Brayton cycle is the difference between the work extracted 
in the expansion process    in step (3'-4') and the work input in the compression pro-
cess    in step (1-2'): 
 
                     (Eq. 4.3) 
        
where        is the work output of the cycle,    the expansion output work and    is 
the compression work. The thermal efficiency of the Brayton cycle          is derived 
from the ratio of useful work extracted from the system         to the amount of heat 
brought into the system between steps (2) and (3')      :  
 
            
      
     
   (Eq. 4.4) 
 
A useful method of demonstrating the efficiency of the Brayton cycle is with the pres-
sure ratio in the compression and expansion processes, which in the ideal case is as-
sumed to be the same for both: 
 
                             
  
  
 
  
  
   (Eq. 4.5)         
 
where   is the pressure ratio,    the pressure at compressor outlet and    the inlet pres-
sure,    pressure at turbine inlet and    pressure after the turbine. In the ideal case the 
efficiency can be expressed as follows assuming constant pressure heat addition and 
rejection: 
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  (     )
  (     )
  (Eq. 4.6) 
 
where    is the specific heat at constant pressure, and temperatures at the corresponding 
steps from 1 to 4. In isentropic processes 1-2 and 3-4 the relationship of temperatures to 
pressures are: 
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   (Eq. 4.7) 
  
and similarly: 
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   (Eq. 4.8) 
 
where γ is the ratio of the specific heats of the working fluid (isentropic constant). For 
diatomic gases such as N2 and O2 (together forming most of atmospheric air), the spe-
cific heat ratio is 1.4. Combining equations 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 the ideal cycle efficiency 
can be expressed as a function of the pressure ratio  : 
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)     (Eq. 4.9) 
   
The Eq. 4.9 demonstrates that the efficiency of the ideal Brayton cycle increases as the 
pressure ratio increases. 
Useful method for taking into account the losses and the deviation of the isentropic 
processes in the compression and expansion processes is introducing the individual is-
entropic efficiencies of the components: ηc for the compressor and ηt for the turbine, 
which can be defined as follows with enthalpies h of different states: 
 
     
     
      
   (Eq. 4.10) 
 
     
      
     
   (Eq. 4.11) 
 
where the numbering of the states correspond with the of Figure 4.1. Applying these 
isentropic efficiencies, the turbine work Wt and compressor work Wc can be expressed 
in the following manner: 
 
                                            
 ̇ (     )
  
      (Eq. 4.12) 
 
                               ( ̇   ̇ )(      )    (Eq. 4.13) 
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where  ̇  is the mass flow of air through the engine,  ̇  the mass flow of fuel into the 
combustor. Introducing an efficiency for the combustion process   , the heat addition 
process      can be written: 
 
                                  ̇      (Eq. 4.14) 
 
where    is the lower heating value of the fuel, which represents the amount of heat 
energy gained from the combustion of the fuel. Combining the presented equations, the 
efficiency of the cycle is: 
 
         
     
 ̇   
  (Eq. 4.15) 
 
Examining the above equations 4.10-4.15 shows that the work done per unit of air 
flowing through the engine can be increased by increasing the pressure ratio, decreasing 
the compressor inlet temperature    or increasing the turbine inlet temperature   .  
The optimum pressure ratio calculated for work with the same firing temperature is 
lower than the pressure ratio optimized for the adiabatic thermal efficiency. A method 
for calculating the optimum pressure ratio      for extracting maximum work from the 
cycle is presented in Boyce (2012): 
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                                 (Eq. 4.16) 
 
where    is the turbine inlet temperature and T1 the compressor inlet temperature, γ the 
specific heat ratio and    compressor isentropic efficiency,    turbine isentropic effi-
ciency.  
The turbine inlet temperature (Ttit) is most commonly the defining factor and used 
in standards such as ASME PTC-22 (2005) for power ratings of gas turbines as the tur-
bine blade temperatures limit the performance of the engine. The more detailed gas tur-
bine performance analysis takes into account the losses in actual gas turbine processes 
such as pressure losses in inlet, bleed air mass flow, compressor and turbine mechanical 
and thermal losses, combustion inefficiency et cetera. Detailed performance analysis 
including the different correction formulae for ambient conditions can be found for ex-
ample in Chapter 20 (p. 769-802) of Gas Turbine Engineering Handbook (Boyce 2012). 
Improving the cycle efficiency can be done in numerous ways and it is normally the 
driving force in the gas turbine design development process. Greater efficiency directly 
increases profit made in the electricity market as more power is gained from the same 
amount of fuel, or equivalently, less fuel is needed for a given amount of power. The 
normal cycle efficiency improvement methods are for example: cooling the inlet air; 
injecting water, steam or compressed air between compressor stages; using regeneration 
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or recuperation processes where the air is heated before combustor by exhaust gas heat; 
increasing the firing temperature in the combustor (Boyce 2012). The improvement of 
thermal efficiency of the cycle is not the focal point in the design process of a gas tur-
bine, when the intended use of the engine is in standby emergency power operation, and 
the improvements are actually undesirable as they unnecessarily complicate the gas tur-
bine design.  
The design choices should not strive for the highest possible firing temperatures and 
pressure ratios, but instead focus on stable operation on wide power range and with dif-
ferent ambient conditions. More important use in the emergency application for the 
above equations than considering the efficiency improvements is to consider the effects 
of the ambient conditions on gas turbine performance. The effects of ambient tempera-
ture on gas turbine performance are shown in Figure 4.3, which is constructed from data 
of GE gas turbines. 
 
Figure 4.3: Effect of ambient temperature on gas turbine output (Brooks 2000) 
 As stated earlier, the inlet temperature and pressure affect the performance of the en-
gine greatly and when sizing the engine this must be noted. For example as the ambient 
temperature rises, more work is consumed by the compressor to achieve same pressure 
ratio and this results in less power output from the engine. This means the engine must 
be sufficiently oversized in power that the required safety functions can be performed in 
extremely hot conditions. This fact leads to running the engine at partial loads in cold 
conditions, which might bring challenges to the operating stability. 
4.2. Design Aspects of Gas Turbines 
Major part in the design process of gas turbines is determining the right main compo-
nents of the gas turbine to achieve the desired balance between performance qualities, 
reliability and costs. The different processes of the thermodynamic Brayton cycle can be 
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performed various components and no single solution is right for every application. 
Thus it is important to identify the characteristics of different types of components used 
in gas turbine engines and choose the components that fit the desired operating range 
best. 
For power generation and industrial applications, the optimization of the cost-
efficiency of the gas turbine is naturally the main driving force. Increasing the thermal 
efficiency of the engine is important as the largest individual cost of a gas turbine dur-
ing its life-time is the fuel. The greater thermal efficiency of the engine directly reduces 
specific fuel consumption and therefore also costs. Another source of costs in gas tur-
bines is the governmental restrictions on the emissions from the engine, which requires 
special attention in the gas turbine design. Emissions are becoming increasingly con-
trolled and taxed by governments that strive to reduce the environmental effects of 
burning fuels with international agreements. Emissions produced by the combustion 
processes cannot be completely avoided but with the choice of right components, they 
can be reduced significantly. (Boyce 2012) 
A different set of criteria is more relevant when the gas turbine is meant to be used 
as an emergency power unit. The operating time of the engine annually is limited, and 
the fuel costs are relatively insignificant in comparison with the costs caused by the 
non-availability of the engine. The standby gas turbine units forgo the design choices 
for maximum efficiency and replace them with robust design for maximized availability 
and reliability for starting up and continuous operation.  
Most of the development of new technologies in gas turbines in last decades has fo-
cused on increasing the efficiency through increased pressure ratios and firing tempera-
tures, but this has reduced the availability of the gas turbines in many cases and thus 
offset the economic advantage of the higher efficiency. (Boyce 2012, Hansen 1996)  
Recognizing the different characteristics of the main components of the gas turbine is 
the key to finding the right combination of components for intended application and 
operating ranges.  
4.2.1. Compressor 
Compressor is the gas turbine engine component where the working fluid, normally 
atmospheric air, is pressurized by external work. The three main types of compressor 
are the axial-flow compressor, centrifugal compressor and the positive displacement 
compressor. Positive displacement compressor can be used for low flow but high pres-
sure systems, such as the lubrication system of the gas turbine. (Boyce 2012) 
Centrifugal and axial-flow compressors are the main compressor choices for the 
compression process of the Brayton cycle. Both are continuous flow compressors that 
are used for pressurizing the atmospheric air up to the discharge pressure before the 
combustor by exerting shaft work to the flow. The gain of static pressure in a compres-
sor rotor stage is observed as a rise of specific enthalpy   , which can be calculated as 
in Larjola (1997): 
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where    is the relative flow velocity at blade exit,    relative velocity at inlet,    
blade tip speed at exit and    blade tip speed at inlet. Summing up the enthalpy gains in 
all compressor stages, the total enthalpy gain of the complete compressor can be deter-
mined and further obtain the pressure ratio produced in the compressor. As described 
earlier the pressure ratio is a significant value as it directly relates to the efficiency of 
the gas turbine engine, and so it is commonly used to evaluate gas turbine performance. 
Another deciding factor when choosing the compressor type is the desired flow rate 
through the engine. The axial-flow compressor type is used when a high flow rate is 
desired.  The axial-flow compressor increases the fluid flow velocity with the rotor 
blades and then the flow is diffused in the stator blades to achieve the conversion of 
dynamic pressure to static pressure in the working fluid. Additionally, before the first 
stage of the compressor, inlet guide vanes are often used to direct the flow in a desired 
angle to the rotor blades.  A single set of rotor blades and stator blades is called a stage. 
The first stage of an axial-flow compressor following the inlet guide vanes can be seen 
in Figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.4: Inlet guide vanes and the first stage of an axial-flow compressor 
The compressor can have multiple successive stages depending on the desired pressure 
ratio and the size of the engine. Axial-flow compressors generally have higher efficien-
cies than centrifugal compressors, but it comes with a price as the operating range is 
usually much more limited. Axial-flow compressors are the more widely used option in 
the power generation industry as the higher efficiency becomes the deciding factor and 
also the size of the engine becomes large enough that the axial flow compressor is actu-
ally the only feasible choice. 
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Centrifugal compressors are generally more suited to be used in smaller gas turbines 
with smaller heat rates because of their worse efficiency in comparison. Centrifugal 
compressors have the advantage of smooth operation and larger tolerance of fluctua-
tions in the required power, a desired quality in process industry where chemical pro-
cesses have large power requirement changes. The centrifugal compressors are also 
considerably more reliable and produce higher pressure ratio per stage than axial-flow 
compressors.  
In a centrifugal compressor the air flows axially into the rotating impeller, where 
the impeller blades increase the velocity of the fluid and it then exits the impeller in 
radial direction. The conversion of the dynamic pressure of the fluid flow to static pres-
sure according to the Bernoulli principle is achieved in the stationary diffuser, which 
consists of vanes tangential to the impeller. 
An example of a centrifugal compressor performance map is presented in Figure 
4.5 with pressure ratio as the ordinate and corrected mass flow as abscissa. The perfor-
mance map for an axial-flow compressor is similar, with a slightly narrower operating 
range. 
 
Figure 4.5: Centrifugal compressor performance map (Mkronowski, 2011) 
As the pressure ratio is increased with a constant mass flow in the compressor, and the 
values approach the surge line, a condition called compressor surge starts occurring. 
Surging causes the flow inside the compressor to rapidly reverse direction due to drop-
ping of backpressure and then reversed back to the original direction. The instability 
caused by the compressor surge is quickly destructive for the engine and must be avoid-
ed to preserve the integrity of the components. The condition of surge is usually easily 
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noticeable as excessive vibration and audible sound occurs in the compressor. Accord-
ing to Boyce (2012), extensive investigations have been conducted on surge but predict-
ing it exactly in the design phase remains difficult. Safest approach to avoiding the con-
dition is operating the compressor well below the surge line. 
As the mass flow through the compressor increases, eventually the choke point is 
reached. This is the point where the mass flow reaches its maximum value and "stone-
walls", meaning the flow can't be increased further at the same operating speed as the 
gas flows at sonic speed. As the choke point is approached, the pressure losses increase 
and the efficiency of the compressor drops rapidly so this condition must also be avoid-
ed in the operation. The operating range of the gas turbine lies between the surge and 
choke lines with sufficient margin on both ends to avoid the conditions of surge and 
choke. 
4.2.2. Combustor 
The function of the combustor in the gas turbine is to increase the enthalpy of the high 
pressure working fluid, which can be further converted to useful shaft work in the ex-
pansion process in the turbine. From the thermodynamic point-of-view, the heat addi-
tion of the Brayton cycle is achieved in the combustor, ideally with minimal pressure 
loss. Important input values for the combustor are the pressure and temperature after the 
compressor because they affect the performance and material requirements of the com-
bustor. Combustor output is the high-temperature working fluid including the exhaust 
gases from the combustion that are lead to the turbine inlet.  
The inlet temperatures of combustors normally range from 454 ºC up to 857 ºC de-
pending on the compressor pressure ratio and whether the gas turbine has regeneration 
or not. Newer aircraft engines can reach as high as 45:1 pressure ratio and combustor 
inlet temperatures between 541 ºC and 925 ºC and exit temperatures between 957 ºC to 
1593 ºC, limited by the material properties of the turbine blades. The temperature data 
presented here has been collected by Boyce (2012) from the gas turbine industry.  
Contemporary combustor research and development goals focus on improving the 
firing temperature meanwhile reducing nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions, which are in-
creased directly proportionally to the firing temperature. The NOx emissions are regu-
lated by governments based on international agreements such as the Directive 
2001/81/EC of the European Union. Emission reduction is extremely relevant in the 
design of gas turbines for commercial power generation; in the standby and emergency 
gas turbine cases emission levels are pretty insignificant when the annual operating 
times are low and especially in the case of a safety equipment of a nuclear power plant 
it is excluded from the emission control scope.  
More focus in the combustor design in a standby safety application is directed to the 
ease of maintenance and reliability of operation as with other components of the engine. 
The simplest and most commonly used type of combustors is the conventional diffusion 
combustor. The name diffusion combustor comes from the way the incoming air is dif-
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fused to slow it down so the flame can be maintained more easily and reliably, and to 
prevent the flame from being carried on downstream of the combustor. Diffusion com-
bustor uses only about 10 % of the compressor air in the combustion process and the 
rest is used for mixing and cooling purposes. The simplicity and proven reliability 
makes the diffusion combustor a very likely choice for a safety-critical gas turbine, 
when the emission reduction technologies are not needed. 
4.2.3. Turbine 
Turbine is the component of the gas turbine engine where the energy stored in the work-
ing fluid flow is converted to mechanical shaft work. In the axial-flow turbine this is 
achieved by successive stages of rotating and stationary turbine blades. Radial-inflow 
turbines are very similar to centrifugal compressor, only the direction of the flow is re-
versed and the rotation is in the opposite direction. The names of the components also 
change according to their function: where the flowing fluid in a centrifugal compressor 
exits through the diffuser, radial-inflow turbines have nozzle guide vanes to direct the 
flow to the turbine impeller blades.  
The flow interacts with the turbine blades, decreasing its velocity, and the energy of 
the flow is converted into a more useful form in the shaft. The energy recovered from a 
turbine rotor (single stage) per unit mass flow is given by the Euler turbine equation (p. 
784, Boyce 2012),  
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where     is the adiabatic energy generated on the rotor,    is the standard gravity,    
is the rotor blade speed at inlet,     tangential component of flow absolute velocity at 
inlet,    and     respectively at the exit. 
The turbine can be either axial-flow or radial-inflow depending on the intended ap-
plication and desired performance of the turbine similarly to the compressor. The rela-
tionship between the turbine types is similar to the centrifugal and axial compressors'. 
The greatest advantage the radial in-flow turbine has compared to the axial-flow turbine 
is the higher work produced per stage, which can be even 2 to 3 times higher. The pow-
er output of a turbine is a function of the square of the blade tip speed, and this value is 
higher in radial-inflow turbines, so at any given flow rate the work is greater in the radi-
al-inflow turbine.  
The usefulness of radial-inflow turbines is limited by its poorer efficiency perfor-
mance in almost all operating ranges. Also the cooling of the turbine is harder to design 
than in the axial turbine, which severely limits turbine inlet temperature. These facts, 
combined with the similarity of the axial-flow to steam turbines, which have a long de-
velopment history, have made the axial turbine the most common choice for gas tur-
bines. (Boyce 2012) 
 38 
4.2.4. Cooling 
The most critical part of the engine that requires cooling is the first stage of blades in 
the turbine. Turbine blade cooling system of the gas turbine can be designed in multiple 
ways depending on the size of the engine and intended operation. If the turbine inlet 
temperature is very high, the materials of the first stage turbine blades in an axial-flow 
turbine are subjected to great thermal stresses and to reduce these, the blades have to be 
cooled. The cooling can be either air cooling or water and steam may also be used when 
more efficient cooling is required. 
Different air cooling techniques include: convection cooling, impingement cooling, 
film cooling and transpiration cooling (Boyce 2012). Bleed air from the compressor are 
usually used as a coolant for the turbine blades as only a part of the working fluid is 
needed in the actual combustion process. If the firing temperatures are low, the air cool-
ing is sufficient to maintain the temperature of the turbine blades low enough. In water 
and steam cooling systems the coolant is passed through tubes inside the blade and 
ejected as steam from the tip of the blade, which provides very efficient cooling of the 
blade. These systems have the drawback of requiring much more complex coolant cir-
culation and blade design. Steam cooling of the turbine blades is normally used in com-
bined cycle process where steam is readily available from the waste heat steam boiler. 
Convection cooling is the most widely used form of cooling in contemporary gas 
turbines. In convection cooling the radial air flow inside the turbine blades and vanes 
passes through the blade from hub to tip and removes the heat through the wall. Im-
pingement cooling is a form of convection cooling where the cooling air is blasted on 
the inner surface of the blade by high-velocity air jets. Film cooling forms a thermal 
insulation layer between the hot gas stream and the turbine blade and thus achieves low-
er blade temperatures. Transpiration cooling requires the blade material to be porous as 
the coolant removes the heat directly from the hot gas stream by passing through the 
porous wall of the blade. The goal of all these different methods is to increase the heat 
flux from the turbine blade material to the coolant air. (Boyce 2012) 
4.2.5. Rotor Dynamics 
As a high-speed rotating machine, a gas turbine is subjected to large mechanical forces 
caused by vibrations inside the engine itself and is also relatively sensitive to external 
forces. Continued vibrations can be harmful for the engine components and cause wear, 
or in the worst case they can even lead to quick destruction of the engine. To prevent 
these problems, detailed analysis of the vibration characteristics of the engine has to be 
conducted by the engine manufacturer. Rotor dynamics calculations give tools for iden-
tifying critical speeds of operation and the balancing requirements of the engine. 
Vibration systems can be roughly divided into two different groups; free vibration 
and forced vibration. A free vibration system has no external forces acting on the sys-
tem, and so only the internal forces of the system causes vibrations. Because of no ex-
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ternal forces, a free vibration system will oscillate at one or more of its natural frequen-
cies. Forced vibration, on the other hand, is vibration caused by external force acting on 
the system called the excitation force. A forced vibration system oscillates at the fre-
quency of the excitation force, which is independent of the natural frequency of the cor-
responding free system. If the frequency of the excitation force coincides with a natural 
frequency (harmonic) of the system, problems arise; a condition called resonance is 
encountered and it can quickly enhance the vibration amplitude to such degree that the 
system is damaged. (Boyce 2012, Nelson 2007) 
A gas turbine is a complex system of vibrations, both natural and forced. One im-
portant point to consider is the existence of multiple natural frequencies of rotation gen-
erally called critical speeds. If the gas turbine is operated well below the first critical 
natural frequency, it is called a subcritical system. A subcritical engine would be safe to 
operate without any consideration of the vibrations and would be highly desirable, but 
their use is limited to only very small applications. As the size of the rotating machine 
increases, the mass of the rotor also increases and an upper limit for the shaft size that 
could be subcritical is reached. These facts combined with high speeds mean that sub-
critical operation is not feasible, and the machine is required to be operated above the 
first critical speed (supercritical). Normal supercritical operation of the system is stable, 
but the main problems arise during start-up or shut-down sequences when the rotational 
speed of the engine goes through the critical speed range. To avoid damage to the en-
gine, the amplitude of the vibrations must be kept under control by adequate damping 
performed by bearings and foundations. 
Many different kinds of excitation forces act on different parts of a gas turbine and 
the resulting vibrations vary in mechanisms as well as severity. Some are quickly de-
structive; some are smaller in amplitude but nevertheless cause damage in the long run 
due to alternating stresses on the engine components. The forces affecting the rotor-
bearing system can be external forces affecting the system through the casing and foun-
dations or internal instabilities caused by the rotor motion and material properties.  
Examples of external forces that are transmitted through the casing and foundations 
of the engine are strain caused by misalignment of piping or nearby reciprocating ma-
chinery. Forces acting on the casing and foundation of the engine usually cause destruc-
tive vibration in the gas turbine but these problems can be avoided through proper lay-
out design of the whole facility and taking these factors into account in the vibration 
analysis.  
Forced vibrations are caused to the rotor-bearing system by the rotor motion inside 
the gas turbine. The frequencies of these forced vibrations are the shaft rotating speed or 
multiples of this speed. Also blade passing frequencies or other component frequencies 
can be present in the forced vibration spectrum. The critical frequency of the forced 
vibration remains constant at any shaft speed, damping does not affect the frequency, it 
only reduces the amplitude of the vibration. Forced vibrations have peak amplitudes in 
narrow frequency bands, so operating above or below these frequencies prevent the 
problem they present.  
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Another type of rotor-bearing instability is the self-excited vibrations which have an 
onset shaft rotational speed, above which they occur with increasing amplitude. The 
frequency of these vibrations is relatively independent of the shaft speed after onset and 
the only ways of eliminating these self-excited vibrations are operating below the onset 
shaft speed or introducing sufficient damping to reduce the effects of them. The self-
excited vibrations result in force components on the rotor shaft which lead to motion of 
the shaft around its center of axis. This type of motion is called whirl and there exists 
several types of it depending on the inducing mechanism. Examples of whirls exhibiting 
in a gas turbine are hysteretic whirl, dry-friction whirl, oil whirl and aerodynamic whirl. 
These whirl conditions are harmful for the engine components in the long run and cause 
friction losses, so they should be eliminated as well as possible in the design phase. 
Vibration measurements are based on the three different characteristics of the vibra-
tion: displacement, velocity and acceleration. These monitored values emphasize differ-
ent parts of the vibration as shown in the following example. A simple harmonic vibra-
tion can be mathematically expressed as follows: 
 
             (Eq. 4.19) 
   ̇           (Eq. 4.20) 
   ̈             (Eq. 4.21) 
 
where   is displacement,  ̇ is velocity,  ̈ is acceleration,   the vibration amplitude and 
  the frequency. Considering the maxima of the above equations it can be observed that 
the displacement is independent of the frequency (it is only present in the periodic sine 
function), velocity is proportional to frequency and the acceleration is proportional to 
the square of the frequency. If the frequency and displacement is known, the accelera-
tion and velocity can be simply calculated by integration. Due to the slight differences 
between these values, the measurement methods also differ and generally several types 
of sensors are needed to sufficiently analyze the vibrations in a gas turbine. 
Fourier analysis is a mathematical tool that is used for analyzing the vibration be-
havior of a gas turbine through the measurements. The vibrations measured during bal-
ancing of the engine are continuous and periodic, and so they can be expressed as a sum 
of periodic functions, which is called the Fourier series. The Fourier transformation of 
these time-dependent functions converts the functions into frequency domain where the 
natural frequencies of the vibrations can be analyzed from the frequency spectrum. 
These natural frequencies are the often called critical speed harmonics of the gas tur-
bine. Example of results obtained from vibration analysis by Fourier's methods is pre-
sented in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.6: Fourier analysis of vibrations (Boyce 2012) 
Figure 4.6 shows how the Fourier transform converts the parts of the original time 
signal to a spectrum of oscillatory functions into the frequency domain. 
The Campbell diagram is a useful tool for plotting the vibration behavior of a gas 
turbine in respect to the shaft speed. It shows the natural frequency regions and different 
excitation frequencies of the gas turbine system that should be avoided in operation to 
prevent shaft or blade failure (Boyce 2012). A simplified example of a Campbell dia-
gram is presented in Figure 4.7, where a few blade passing harmonic frequencies (1
st
, 
2
nd
, 3
rd
 mode) are plotted vs. shaft rotational speed and 3 excitation frequencies are pre-
sent.   
 
Figure 4.7: Campbell diagram 
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If the engine is continuously run in the vicinity (speed and frequency regions inside the 
red squares in Figure 4.7) of the critical speeds, the excessive blade vibrations might be 
excited and this can potentially lead to blade failure due to material fatigue. Blade and 
rotor vibration conditions and methods for measurements are constantly studied (for 
example: Forbes & Randall 2009, Ogbonnoyanna & Theophilus-Johnson 2011) to gain 
better knowledge and make it possible to predict the behavior of blade-rotor systems.  
The Campbell diagram can be generated from design calculations of the engine by 
computing analytical eigenfrequencies or from actual operating data, where measured 
vibration response spectrum is plotted vs. the shaft rotation speed. Comparing the ana-
lytical results with the measured values can be used for verification of the vibration 
analysis. These results from the vibration analysis are used to establish the ranges of 
rotational speed, where the engine may be run continuously, and which speeds need to 
be avoided. 
4.2.6. Gas Turbine Reliability and Availability 
The engine reliability upon demand is of high importance as the AAC unit is essentially 
the last emergency power source for alternating current that powers the safety systems 
that mitigate the consequences of a severe nuclear accident. Similarly, the availability 
factor of the unit must be as high as achievable, meaning the downtime due to mainte-
nance operations are kept to a minimum. Starting up and operating reliably is extremely 
important for a safety-critical engine and most contemporary gas turbines can't achieve 
sufficient reliability to be considered for the application without improvements. In fact 
the developments in the gas turbines have gone the opposite direction than the desired. 
The problems in gas turbine reliability developments according to Curley et al. (1994) 
as stated by Hansen (1996) have been related to the fast advancements in the thermal 
efficiency and emission reducing combustion techniques. The advantage considering the 
application of the gas turbine as emergency power source is that these improvements are 
not desired and older, proven design can be used. 
Gas turbine reliability is established for both the start-up and continuous operation 
of the engine. Start-up reliability of the engine is defined as the percentage of successful 
start-ups from the total start-up attempts. This figure is very vital for the intended appli-
cation, more so than in commercial gas turbine applications, where the failure of the 
start-up leads has no immediate severe consequences. Failure to start usually leads to 
downtime as the turbine side needs to be purged from any fuel that has not been com-
busted, a condition which naturally needs to be avoided. (Boyce 2012)  
The reliability of the gas turbine can be analyzed from the component level with the 
FMEA method as described earlier in chapter 3.2.1. The data for these analyses is gath-
ered from operating experiences and tests, where the likely sources of failures in a gas 
turbine are identified. The sources of failures can for example be materials failing from 
fatigue due to high temperatures or variable vibration conditions as studied by Cruse et 
al. (1997) and Forbes & Randall (2009) or problems in the combustor as studied by 
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Rafsanjani & Nasab (2012). Appendix A shows an example compilation of component 
diagnostics that can be observed with monitoring systems as presented by Boyce 
(2012). Fuel or lubrication oil systems are also very critical as obstructions in these sys-
tems quickly lead to a need for engine shutdown (Boyce 2012). Most of the common 
failure sources can be eliminated with good quality control. Redundant design is used to 
further increase reliability where possible, but inevitably there remains some probability 
of failure for all components. 
Failure-rates for all critical components of the engine should be established in the 
reliability analysis with sufficient proof. The data is then combined to form an overall 
probability of failure-to-operate for the complete gas turbine engine. This final output of 
the FMEA is incorporated in the overall Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the nuclear 
power plant. Example requirements for failure probabilities are presented in the EASA 
CS-E (2010) standard section 510 "Safety Analysis". For aircraft turbine engines the 
requirement is a probability of 1·10
-8
 failures per flight hour for hazardous engine faults 
that prevent further use of the engine, and 1·10
-5
 for major engine faults where output 
power is at least partially lost. A similar reliability confidence is desirable for the emer-
gency power source gas turbine as the operating hours of the gas turbine in this applica-
tion are relatively low, only a few thousand hours between overhauls. This brings the 
failure-rate of the complete engine to acceptable level to achieve safety equipment clas-
sification. 
To achieve this reliability goal, the correct choices should be made in the gas tur-
bine design process. To summarize, the following measures should be considered to 
increase the reliability of the gas turbine: simplicity of design, using proven technology 
solutions, well analyzed performance and vibration behavior, avoiding those operating 
speeds where vibrations might be excited or compressor surge starts occurring, correct 
component and materials choices, and  redundancy and diversity of critical control and 
support systems.  
The availability factor is another important value in a safety device and it should be 
kept as high as possible. Availability factor for the gas turbine generator can be calcu-
lated as the percentage of the time that the engine is available for emergency operation 
from the total number of hours during a year. The availability factor is improved by well 
designed maintenance operations that can be performed as fast as possible to reduce 
downtime and also using reliable components so that no unexpected forced outages are 
encountered.  
4.3. Gas Turbine Types 
Gas turbines are suited for many different applications from base-load and peaking 
power generation to providing shaft power to process equipment or even propulsion 
power for ships and aircraft. Choosing the right gas turbine engine for the right applica-
tion is a matter of finding the right balance between required power, efficiency, starting 
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time, ambient conditions, emission limits, service lifetime or other criteria significant 
for the user of the engine. (Walsh & Fletcher 2004) 
Gas turbines can be used in many different roles in electrical power generation. 
Power grids require base-load power plants to meet the average daily energy demand of 
the grid. The base-load power plants are designed to be operated as much as possible so 
they must have high power and efficiency to be profitable. Combined cycle processes 
have made the gas turbine engine very competitive despite high fuel costs even in base-
load operation due to high thermal efficiency of the combined cycle. (Boyce 2012) 
Peaking power is another important part of the energy market and especially power 
grid stabilization. The energy demand of the consumers in a power grid fluctuates great-
ly depending on time of the day, the day of the week or the outside temperature. During 
times of high demand, the prices of electricity also rise and these kinds of peak energy 
demands are met by peaking power plants which can be started up and connected to the 
power grid quickly. Smaller units that have low initial investment costs are best suited 
for peaking power plants as the higher price acquired from the energy markets makes up 
for the higher fuel cost resulting from the use of low-efficiency engine. (Walsh & 
Fletcher 2004) 
Gas turbines can also be in standby emergency power units in facilities such as hos-
pitals that need emergency power for life-saving equipment as well as basic heating, 
lighting and air conditioning during power outages in the main power grid. These en-
gines must have the capability of starting in a black-out condition, which means that no 
power is available from outside grid. (Walsh & Fletcher 2004)  The application of gas 
turbines as nuclear power plant emergency power source can be seen as an extension of 
this application, only the requirements for reliability and quality of the engine are even 
stricter than normal. 
Short description of different applications and types of gas turbines is in order. The 
data regarding temperatures, powers and efficiencies is presented by Boyce (2012), 
which have been collected from the gas turbine industry. Directions of development in 
the various gas turbine types are also briefly examined. 
4.3.1. Frame-type Heavy Duty Gas Turbine 
Base-load power generation utilizes heavy duty frame-type gas turbines with rated pow-
ers up to 480 MW. These gas turbines can be either used alone, or more efficiently, in 
combined cycle processes where the high heat energy content of the exhaust gases is 
utilized in a boiler to generate steam which in turn drives a steam turbine. The combined 
cycle processes have high thermal efficiencies, as high as 60 % can be achieved with 
very high turbine inlet temperatures of 1500 ºC. These kind of high temperatures intro-
duce problems with the turbine blade materials as the blades are subjected to extreme 
conditions where hot corrosion and thermal fatigue and creep of the materials are all 
likely to occur without proper protection. The thermal problems of the blades can how-
ever be avoided by sufficient cooling and the right choice of materials. Development of 
 45 
materials and cooling techniques have projected that inlet temperatures of even 1650 ºC 
could be reached, which would push the power and efficiency of the unit even higher. 
The frame-type heavy duty gas turbines utilize axial-flow compressors and axial-
flow turbines with pressure ratios from 5:1 in conventional models up to 35:1 in some 
modern designs. The frame-type heavy duty gas turbines are designed to be robust to 
increase life-time of the components and reduce the downtime of the engine due to 
maintenance. This increase in the availability of the engine is important in base-load 
operation where the power plant is expected to produce electricity constantly. (Boyce 
2012)  
4.3.2. Aircraft-derivative Gas Turbine 
Gas turbine engines for aircrafts have always been leaders in the new technologies for 
gas turbines and many of the advancements are made in the research projects for mili-
tary purposes. The design criteria for aircraft engines are high reliability, high perfor-
mance with many starts and flexible operating range. These qualities are also very at-
tractive for many land-based applications and this has lead to the development of air-
craft-derivative gas turbines. (Boyce 2012) 
Aircraft-derivative gas turbines are modified aircraft engines, where a turboprop or 
turbofan engine is used as a gas generator, when the bypass duct of the compressor is 
removed and a few compression stages added. The gas generator has a separate turbine 
for producing internal work for the compressor. The gas generator is connected to a free 
power turbine that produces shaft work from the flow energy that normally provides 
thrust for an aircraft. The coupling between the gas generator and the power turbine is 
usually only aerodynamic and they have separate concentric shafts. This design gives 
the advantage of greater flexibility for part load operation as the gas generator and the 
power turbine can rotate at different speeds. The aircraft-derivative gas turbine engines 
have power range from 2.5 MW up to 50 MW, with efficiencies between 35 and 45 %. 
(Boyce 2012) 
As well as for industrial process power operation, the aircraft-derivative gas tur-
bines are well suited for peaking power plants as they have low initial costs and require 
little space and start up quickly in comparison with base-load power plant types such as 
frame-type gas turbines or steam power plants. The important qualities for this applica-
tion of gas turbines are fast starting capability and ease of operation from a distance and 
relative ease of maintenance. The pressure ratios and efficiencies are similar in peaking 
power gas turbines and the frame-type heavy duty gas turbines but the operation is easi-
er and requires less expensive cooling systems and materials. Generally aircraft-
derivative gas turbine components have had shorter life-times than frame-type gas tur-
bines because of the high-performance choices but advancements have been made in 
this field lately to bring the life-time of aircraft-derivatives closer to those of frame-type 
gas turbines.  
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The 50 MW TwinPac developed by Pratt & Whitney is an example case of an aero-
derivative gas turbine with 2 converted FT8 aircraft engines as gas generators connected 
to a single generator, which improves reliability as the unit can be operated at partial 
load with only 1 engine starting up. (Boyce 2012) 
4.3.3. Small Gas Turbines 
Small gas turbines that produce 5 MW or less are a flexible group as they can be similar 
in design to larger frame-type gas turbines or aircraft-derivatives using basically any 
combination of the radial and axial components. The radial turbomachines are often 
used in smaller gas turbines to bring comparatively high pressure ratio for few stage 
processes.  
Radial-flow components are inherently less efficient than their axial counterparts 
and the small gas turbines usually don't have any turbine blade cooling which lowers the 
possible maximum firing temperature. These features make small gas turbine poor in 
thermal efficiency but the added reliability of the engine components makes them suita-
ble for applications where other criteria dictate the choice of components. Even multiple 
compressors can be connected to a single power turbine improving availability of the 
unit as the engine can operate on part load if one of the compressors fails to start up 
initially.  
An example of a small gas turbine in standby application is the 1895 kW gas tur-
bine manufactured by Kongsberg, with a one-stage centrifugal compressor and a single 
stage radial-inflow turbine, running at 16.7% efficiency, which is used as a standby 
power unit with a 99.3% starting reliability. (Boyce 2012) 
4.4. Gas Turbine and Diesel Engine Comparison 
Gas turbines and diesel engines are largely similar in that they can be used as small to 
mid-range standby power units running at medium-speed. The few key differences be-
tween the engines are however significant and should be discussed to determine what 
advantages would gas turbine engine have as an emergency power unit for nuclear pow-
er plant. 
One of the greatest advantages of the diesel engine is clearly the proven reliability 
for decades in nuclear safety application as nearly all modern commercial light-water 
reactors have diesel engines and generators for emergency power supply. The diesel 
engine starts up a lot faster, after 10 seconds power loads can be connected to the gener-
ator, whereas even the fastest gas turbines have at least 40 seconds to 1 minute starting 
time. This makes gas turbines unlikely choices for main emergency power source as the 
quick start-up is more critical for them.  
Diesel engine has better fuel economy than a gas turbine almost through all operat-
ing conditions but especially in part load and load changing conditions. Also, the recip-
rocating diesel engine can be kept in idle running with low fuel consumption as opposed 
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to gas turbines which have very poor idling capabilities (at least efficiency-wise). The 
higher fuel requirement of the gas turbine is counterbalanced by the significantly less-
ened amount of lubrication oil consumption. 
A gas turbine engine has a better power-to-weight ratio meaning at any given power 
rating the gas turbine is smaller by both volume and weight, the reason why gas turbines 
have become so popular in aircrafts. Another good reason to use gas turbine instead of a 
diesel engine is that the vibrations transmitted to the structure from operating the gas 
turbine are significantly smaller because of the difference in the motion of the engine; 
reciprocating motion of the diesel engine generates larger forces than the rotating gas 
turbine. Gas turbines have a large moment of inertia because of the high speed of rota-
tion, which in turn helps accept large individual loads without stalling.  
Another advantage of the gas turbine is that with a low turbine inlet temperature, it 
can be operated without external cooling circuit, instead using bleed air from the com-
pressor to cool the blades. This is a major advantage as fewer components and systems 
are less likely to fail and thus the reliability of the engine grows. Additionally the noise 
generated by a gas turbine differs from the diesel engine in that the high-pitch noise is 
easier to suppress. (Walsh & Fletcher 2004) 
4.5. Gas Turbines in Nuclear Power Plants 
Gas turbines have not been thus far used as safety related equipment meant for emer-
gency power generation in nuclear power plants. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) 
have proposed the concept of using gas turbines for both as main emergency power 
sources and as alternative AC sources in their US-APWR nuclear power plant design. In 
designs offered for TVOs Olkiluoto 4, a number of vendors propose to use gas turbines 
as alternative AC sources to be used as emergency power sources for DEC and SA. 
Presently, the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant site has a gas turbine power plant 
OLKT in a joint ownership of TVO and Fingrid, the company responsible for the Finn-
ish national electricity transmission grid. The OLKT plants purpose is to be used by 
Fingrid as back-up power source for grid stabilizing, in case of power plant disconnec-
tions, or other abnormalities in the transmission grid. The OLKT unit also has a role as 
investment protection power supply for TVO and can be connected to the nuclear power 
plant electrical systems but is not classified as a safety related device (Class EYT).  The 
OLKT unit is equipped with two TwinPac 50 MW aero-derivative gas turbines. 
The Forsmark (Sweden) nuclear power plant site owned by Vattenfall AB also has a 
gas turbine unit with 40 MW capacity. The gas turbine is connected to the power plant 
electrical systems in case the outside electrical power is lost and all diesel generators 
fail to function (SBO). The gas turbine energizes the diesel bus bars in all units (For-
smark 1-3) at the plant site. (Heimbrand & Dominicus 2011) 
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5. JUSTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS  
5.1. Alternative AC Unit 
The requirement specification decisions for the alternative AC facility for a nuclear 
power unit and justifications for them are discussed in this chapter. Figure 5.1 shows 
the basic scope of the systems that are critical for the operation of the AAC unit. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Scope of AAC facility systems 
Utilizing the background knowledge and guidelines presented earlier in this thesis, re-
quirement specifications for a station black-out gas turbine and AAC unit were devel-
oped as part of the Licensing Feasibility Studies (LFS) of OL4 nuclear unit procurement 
project for Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). The detailed specifications document will 
remain confidential. The choices are based on the regulations for nuclear safety and 
industry-approved standards that ensure quality and function of the gas turbine and all 
auxiliaries related to the safety function. 
5.1.1. Gas Turbine Power Rating 
The power rating of the gas turbine engine is defined as the nominal power the gas tur-
bine is able to generate continuously operating at nominal speed. The power rating is an 
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important factor in the gas turbine selection process: the greater the rated power, the 
larger the engine size and more complicated engine design is required, which in turn 
increases susceptibility to failures. Power rating is a limiting factor considering some 
components such as the centrifugal compressor or radial-inflow turbines as they become 
unacceptable choices if the power rating of the engine grows too high. Also, higher 
power rating requires higher turbine inlet temperature, which in turn increases the need 
for cooling the turbine blades, further complicating the engine design. 
The required power rating for the gas turbine generator is determined by calculating 
the peak apparent power balance from the loads in the circuit the gas turbine generator 
supplies power to. In nuclear power plants these circuits are called emergency power 
trains, which consist of all the safety equipment that are needed for handling different 
operating or accident conditions. As an alternative AC source, the facility is designed to 
start up and provide power for the safety systems allocated to it in case of a DEC or SA 
condition as defined in the nuclear regulations and safety analyzes.  
The power rating calculations should take into account at least the following power 
loads: motor loads of the safety device such as pumps, fans or blowers, other power 
loads such as heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC), and lighting systems, non-
uniform distribution of the power loads, power load switching, transmission and genera-
tor losses. The power factors of the individual devices in the power trains must also be 
taken into account in the power balance calculations to achieve the required actual pow-
er. 
The engines and generators are required to be rated for higher power output than the 
value acquired from balance calculations would require at the time of purchase to cover 
design uncertainties. This added margin in the power rating calculations is called the 
design margin. The regulations for nuclear safety also state that the engine rated power 
should be higher than the result of the balance calculations for added safety. YVL 5.1 
(only the old YVL version is available, in the new system it is the YVL E.10) and the 
standard for emergency diesel generators (KTA 3702 2000) state that the safety margin 
of at least 10% of the required power is added to the engine. In addition, the nuclear 
power plant owner may require a spare margin in the power rating to cover for possible 
increase in the power loads if the power plant is later modified. In this case we deter-
mined that 10% owner margin is required for future enlargements. Eq. 5.1 shows an 
example calculation of the rated power adding the different design margins: 
 
                                                      (Eq.5.1)  
 
The power rating of a gas turbine depends greatly on the ambient conditions, as the re-
quired compressor work increases when the temperature of the air at the inlet increases 
and less useful work can be extracted from the engine. This makes the gas turbine sus-
ceptible to major variations in output power throughout the different ambient tempera-
tures present during a normal year at the installation site of Olkiluoto, Finland. Using 
the deterministic approach to the power plant safety analysis, the power rating required 
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has to be calculated with the worst-case scenario in mind, using the most adverse com-
bination of ambient conditions of air temperature, pressure and wind speed. Physically 
impossible situations such as extremely hot temperature combined with heavy snowing 
should naturally be omitted from the power balance calculations. 
During normal steady-state operation of the gas turbine when the compressor and 
turbine are running at nominal speed, the power at the generator output should be able 
to supply the power train reliably with required power from anywhere between the min-
imum power load to 100 % of the rated power. The minimum power load the gas tur-
bine engine can safely continuously supply has to be established by the engine manufac-
turer and tested before the engine is accepted. Possible conditions where the engine 
would be idle running should be limited in the design process to prevent damage to the 
gas turbine.  
In addition to the safety margins presented in Eq. 5.1, the gas turbine engine is re-
quired to have capacity to be operated above the maximum rated power for a short dura-
tion, similarly to diesel engines in the same application. The KTA 3702 standard re-
quires diesel engines to be able to operate at 110 % of the rated power for one hour du-
ration and afterwards maintain continuous rated power. The CS-E standard (EASA 
2011) for aircraft turbine engines has a similar overload power rating which is called the 
OEI-rating (One-Engine-Inoperative), which means the engine has to be able to produce 
power in excess of its normal rated power if one engine of a multi-engine fails. Turbine 
engines for aircraft normally have multiple OEI-ratings for different durations starting 
from a few minutes to half an hour and even continuous OEI-ratings exist. Setting the 
overload capacity requirement for the gas turbine for the standby AAC operation fol-
lows the diesel engine overload requirement of 110 %. When operating a gas turbine on 
the overload capacity, it should be noted that the additional thermal and mechanical 
stresses reduces the maximum time between maintenance overhauls as the engine com-
ponents wear out faster. 
5.1.2. Alternative AC Facility Layout 
The gas turbine engine is operated as an Alternative AC source as Safety Class 3 
equipment for DEC and SA conditions as specified earlier. As a backup system for the 
Safety Class 2 main emergency diesel generators (EDG), the AAC system should be 
completely separated both functionally and physically to prevent common cause failures 
knocking out all systems. The physical and functional separation and independence 
from the main EDGs required by the nuclear regulations is achieved in the layout design 
of the nuclear unit when all the electrical cabling, instrumentation and control systems, 
piping and fire protection systems are designed to be separate. The goal of this separa-
tion principle is that a failure of any individual system in either the EDGs or the AAC 
facility does not cause any further failures in other systems.  
The independent AAC sources also follow the same principle, so that they have the 
minimum amount of common systems. One recommendable option for the physical 
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separation is to place the independent AAC facilities to opposite sides of the nuclear 
unit as this certainly would ensure that an internal hazard such as a fire could not possi-
bly cut off both AAC sources. The fuel storage tank located at the nuclear power plant 
site is one the AAC systems share, but the fuel pipelines feeding the AAC units should 
be separate and have sufficient distance between them so that the breaking of both pipe-
lines from a common cause would be highly unlikely. Similarly the electric cables and 
cables of the control systems must be put in different cable trays and routed away from 
the cabling of the other AAC unit. 
The layout design of the AAC unit should include a Local Control Room (LCR), 
where the gas turbine engine can be started up and operated with authorization from the 
main control room of the nuclear unit. Functional test runs of the engine are normally 
performed from the LCR periodically according to the safety and maintenance require-
ments of the nuclear unit. The local control room should be designed such that it is ac-
cessible from elsewhere than the engine room and the sound level inside the LCR 
should remain low enough so that the facility can be operated without protective equip-
ment. This ensures that the high sound pressure levels generated by the engine will not 
prevent operation of the unit in emergency cases. Finnish Governmental Decree VNA 
2006/85 on protection of workers from excessive noise requires working environments 
with noise levels of less than 80 dB so this is the maximum allowable noise level inside 
the LCR during operation. 
Another important point to consider in the AAC unit layout design is the maintaina-
bility of the unit. The passageways to the facility and the placement of different compo-
nents should allow easy accessibility so that the components can be reached and ex-
changed without the need for major disassembling. The goal of this is to perform the 
required maintenance operations as quickly as possible and thus reduce the total una-
vailability time of the facility. The passageways to the AAC unit should also allow for 
hauling of the largest individual components of the gas turbine engine so they can be 
exchanged in case they are damaged beyond on-site repair. 
5.1.3. Gas Turbine and Generator Connection 
The choice of method for connecting the gas turbine engine to the driven equipment - in 
this case the generator - depends on the engine components and desired performance 
qualities. The simplest design choice is the single-spool engine, where the compressor, 
turbine and generator rotate all at same speed.  This type of gas turbine engine avoids 
using a transmission gearbox, and instead uses simple couplings between the shafts. 
This is a major advantage as the gearing constitutes an additional source for failures that 
could lead to unavailability. The downside of the single-spool engine is that the operat-
ing range and capability to withstand load variations decrease as the rotation speeds of 
all components are the same, defined by the generator (generally rotating at 1500 rpm in 
50 Hz systems).  
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The use of a reduction gearbox between the gas turbine and the generator brings the 
advantage that more stable operating speeds can be achieved for the compressor side of 
the gas turbine. As the components rotate at different speeds, the critical speeds ac-
quired from the vibration analysis can be avoided. Another major advantage is that also 
the compressor surge and choke conditions can be safely avoided when the rotating 
speed of the compressor can be kept well under control. The drawback of using the 
gearbox is that the gearing face very severe conditions when the gas turbine is operated 
at different, quickly changing power loads.  The gearing teeth are subjected to high vi-
brations in during power load step changes and this can quickly result in gear failure 
and lead to unavailability of the engine, especially if problems arise in the lubrication of 
the gearbox. 
Considering the large and stable operating range required for the safety classified 
gas turbine, single spool design seems unfit for the application. The requirement for the 
connection of the gas turbine and the generator set in the specification leave the choice 
of whether to use gearbox or not to the gas turbine supplier. The reliability of the reduc-
tion gearing, however, needs to be sufficiently proven by both analysis and testing. The 
design and quality of the gearing must to be such that it can withstand without failure 
the vibration conditions and thrust loads resulting from the gas turbine engine through-
out the complete operating range with sufficient confidence.  
5.1.4. Service Life-time of the AAC Unit 
The life-time expectancy of the complete AAC unit and all of the components that are 
subject to wear during operation of the gas turbine has to be established by the supplier 
of the gas turbine. The designed service life-time should cover the functional test runs 
including the start-up procedures, which are normally performed on the gas turbine at 
least once a month. The service life-time of the main components of the engine is pro-
longed by well designed condition monitoring as well as maintenance operations, where 
the engine is inspected thoroughly and any possible signs of wear in the materials are 
observed well in advance before failure occurs. 
The desired life-time requirement set by the purchaser for the gas turbine and the 
AAC unit as a whole is connected to the overall life-time of the nuclear unit. The design 
life of the complete nuclear unit is generally based on the main components of the nu-
clear reactor that are irreplaceable. These mechanical components usually have design 
life-times of 60 years, so this is normally considered as the maximum life-time of the 
nuclear unit. The requirement for the life-time of the gas turbine should of course be as 
high as reasonably possible, so that complete overhauls of the engine should not be re-
quired multiple times during the 60 year period. Considering these arguments, a 30 
years life-time requirement is set for the AAC facility and the main engine and auxiliary 
components accounting for all the start-up and testing procedures over the whole life-
time. This requirement is achieved with well designed maintenance operations and mon-
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itoring systems that indicate any damage to components well in advance. These aspects 
shall be discussed later. 
5.1.5. Gas Turbine Vibrations 
Vibrations in the mechanical components of the gas turbine always eventually lead to 
damage of the components and parts which are subjected to them. Large vibrations on 
the critical frequencies quickly lead to the destruction of the engine and smaller vibra-
tions cause cyclic stresses and wear the components out slowly but surely. Vibration 
conditions may result in for example blade tip rubbing on the seal or bearings wearing 
out and this reduces the life-time of these components significantly. Using the correct 
materials in the bearings, shafts and blades helps prolong their life-time against vibra-
tion loads. The vibration characteristics are initially established in a testing and balanc-
ing rig where the rotor system is balanced as well as possible.  
The next step after balancing tests in vibration damage prevention is avoiding the 
critical speeds of operation by constantly measuring the vibrations in different parts of 
the engine, the shaft and the bearings by the means of displacement probes, velocity 
pick-ups and accelerometers, all of which utilize a vibration transducer to convert the 
information to a time-varying signal that can be analyzed. 
The vibration measurement equipment design and measurement methods should 
follow the standards ISO 10814 "Mechanical vibration. Susceptibility and sensitivity of 
machines to unbalance" and API 616 "Gas Turbines for the Petroleum, Chemical, and 
Gas Industry Services" concerning vibrations in gas turbines.  Standards regarding the 
vibrations in the generator are: ISO 7919-2 "Mechanical vibration on non-reciprocating 
machines - Measurements on rotating shafts and evaluation criteria" for general guide-
lines on rotating shafts, ISO 10816-2 "Mechanical vibration - Evaluation of machine 
vibration by measurements on non-rotating parts" for bearings. The standards demand 
the range of operation speeds to be well outside the torsional or lateral undamped natu-
ral frequencies of the shaft to avoid reaching the critical frequencies that would lead to 
damage of the engine. The standards mentioned above give maximum values for the 
displacement and velocities measured in the rotor shaft and bearings. For example, ISO 
7919-2 defines 4 zones for qualitative assessment of the machine conditions and gives 
boundary values for peak-to-peak displacement that are dependent on the rotational 
speed. The gas turbine was required to be in the highest class of zone A meaning the 
highest allowed peak-to-peak displacement in the shaft is      √    µm, where n is the 
rotational speed in revolutions per minute (rpm). 
The CS-E standard gives detailed requirements on the vibration surveys that need to 
be conducted on the engine. These surveys cover the conditions where the vibrations are 
excited and their consequences and the CS-E demands that the engine materials can 
withstand the possible vibrations with sufficient margin. The vibration surveys are vali-
dated by testing of the engine similarly to the requirements for land-based gas turbines 
so that the vibration conditions present throughout the complete operating range will not 
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cause irreparable damage to the engine that would prevent further operation. The CS-E 
requires the engine to withstand 5 minutes operation on the most critical speed and tem-
perature conditions present in the operating range. This quite demanding requirement is 
set also for the gas turbine in the AAC unit. 
In addition to the engine internal vibrations, also the vibrations transmitted to the 
foundation and civil structures have to be limited in such degree that no structural dam-
age is expected to occur from operating the gas turbine during the life-time of the plant. 
KTA 3702 standard for example limits the vibrations of diesel engine to be less than 3 
% of the static load. The gas turbine inherently transmits less large-amplitude vibration 
to surroundings than a reciprocating engine (Walsh & Fletcher 2004), so the vibrations 
limit could be set even lower for gas turbines than diesel engines if deemed necessary 
for some reason.  
5.1.6. Suitability of the Gas Turbine 
As discussed in chapter 3, there are many different variants of gas turbines that have the 
same fundamental thermal process cycle but have very different technical solutions to 
perform the individual processes. Centrifugal, axial or mixed-flow turbomachinery may 
be used to compress or extract work from the working fluid; the heat addition can be 
done in various types of combustors or even external heating circuit. The entire gas tur-
bine and generator combination may be installed in one driven shaft-train or the engine 
can be of multi-spool design, where the compressor, turbine and generator may have 
individual concentric shafts. The configuration choices greatly affect the performance 
and operating range of the gas turbine, so different types of gas turbines are suited for 
different applications.  
The requirements for the engine configuration are left on the general level to leave 
sufficient room for the engine designer to manoeuvre and decide how best achieve the 
engine qualities required elsewhere in the requirement specifications document. The 
main point is that the suitability of the gas turbine is analyzed with all the available in-
formation and the choices are justified with the right criteria.  
The suitability analysis for a gas turbine intended to be used as a nuclear power 
plant back-up power unit should mainly be focused achieving the highest possible relia-
bility of the gas turbine for starting up and running without failures and additionally 
with high availability factor. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4.2.6, the best reliability of 
the engine is achieved with simple design solutions using proven technologies, which is 
helped by the small power rating requirement of the engine and freedom from emission 
control.  
Although conducting a rigorous suitability analysis is very important in the early 
design phase, the suitability of the engine is ultimately proven only by type testing the 
engine to verify its capability to perform the intended power operation throughout the 
complete operating range.  
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5.2. Operational Requirements 
The AAC unit, the gas turbine engine and the auxiliary systems, is kept continuously in 
a condition where it can immediately start emergency power operation. The engine is 
started up with the starting systems and the power is loaded on the generator sequential-
ly according to the safety design of the unit as soon as the engine has reached nominal 
rotating speed and generator achieved the nominal voltage and frequency. The start-up 
sequence program should be separate for testing and emergency operation. A quick 
power load sequencing program is effective for emergency operation and during period-
ic function test runs, the engine should be started up with a slow starting procedure. 
This measure is taken to improve the life-time of the engine components that are prone 
to thermal wear and fatigue. 
The starting reliability requirements for the gas turbine in the emergency power unit 
are stricter than those for common industrial or even peaking power gas turbines. The 
starting reliability data of diesel generators comes from the many years operated as an 
emergency power source for nuclear power plants whereas gas turbines have no such 
operating experience. This lack of operating experience means that the verification of 
the gas turbines start-up reliability has to be done in the certification type test. 
The starting time is the property of the engine where the gas turbine loses most to 
the diesel engine as described earlier as the starting times of gas turbines are normally 
multiple times slower than diesel engine of comparable size. For example Walsh & 
Fletcher (2004) state that diesel engines normally start up in 10 to 60 seconds while gas 
turbines can take minutes to achieve rated speed after start up signal receipt. The fast 
start-up is not, however, as critical for the Safety Class 3 emergency power source as it 
is for the Safety Class 2 main EDGs because the nuclear unit is normally designed to 
survive in SBO condition without alternating current power for at least a few hours in 
DEC.  
Transient conditions resulting from power load changes are a major concern in the 
AAC unit design, as they can cause failures in the engine function and even damage the 
gas turbine or the generator if their protections fail. Even if the protections functions 
properly, shutdown of the engine is of course undesirable as the engine is then unable to 
perform the intended safety function. An example of the operating transients that could 
present is over-speeding of the gas turbine engine or the generator due to sudden load 
dropping or out-of-step load connections. Should these failures occur, and the engine or 
the generator shaft reach over-speeds of 120 % of their nominal rotation speeds, the 
protections should trip the engine or the generator to protect the integrity of the compo-
nents. The maximum over-speed value of 120 % nominal speed is based on the protec-
tive shutdown limit of the diesel engine and generator presented in the KTA 3702:2000. 
In addition to setting the upper limit tripping value of the rotational speed, also the tran-
sient speed changes resulting from load accepting or load dropping has to be limited so 
the engine is not subjected to excessive transient forces potentially harmful to the en-
gine, generator or the possible gearbox. 
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The operating transients may also include voltage and frequency disturbances in the 
generator, and they are required to be limited in such way that the safety function can be 
performed uninterrupted and no damage is caused to the safety equipment operating in 
the emergency train. The standards such as KTA 3702:2000 in Table 3-2 and IEC 
60034-1:2010 "Rotating electrical machines - Part 1: Rating and Performance" give 
tolerance limit values such as maximum transient frequency or voltage increase or de-
crease, frequency and voltage adjustment times and voltage deviation during power lev-
el changes. The same requirements are set for the generator connected to the gas turbine 
in the AAC facility, as the same voltage and frequency deviation characteristics are used 
as design basis for all electrical safety equipment connected to the safety trains.  
In addition to the operational requirements that are related to the emergency func-
tion, the nuclear unit user may require other operational modes such as synchronous 
operation of the AAC unit with the power plant electrical systems as well as the external 
power grid. These operational modes require additional design effort in the sizing of the 
electrical components such as the switchgear and bus bars, which may need to be sized 
higher than the normal emergency operation of the AAC unit would require. 
5.3. Auxiliary Systems 
The gas turbine engine and generator have multiple supporting systems that are not as 
such part of the engine, but are vital for the continued function and as such must remain 
operational during standby and enable immediate start-up of the engine at any time. 
These auxiliary systems include for example the fuel oil, lubrication oil, cooling, ex-
haust and starting systems, and the electrical systems supplying power to them. Follow-
ing the separation principle, the auxiliary systems have to be functionally and physically 
separated from auxiliary support systems of other emergency power sources. Some ex-
ceptions can be made such as connecting the fuel and lubrication oil storages of the unit 
to other storages, but even in these cases the connection is sufficiently protected and 
failure propagation between them should be limited.  
Similarly, electrical connection between the different auxiliary systems can be 
made, keeping in mind that a failure in lower Safety Class equipment should never 
cause failure in higher Safety Class equipment as required by the YVL B.2 draft ver-
sion.  The auxiliary systems as well as the whole AAC unit have to be well protected 
from both external storms, earthquakes, floods and internal hazards such as fire or ex-
plosions. These protections are mostly the same as those for the whole nuclear unit, but 
the special cases will be discussed for each system separately. 
5.3.1. Starter Systems 
The starter systems of the gas turbine engine are an important part of a standby unit and 
as such also worth considering in this application. The reliability to start up is one of the 
breaking points of the acceptability of the engine as a safety classified device for emer-
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gency operation in nuclear power plant unit. As the engine is required to be started up 
from station black-out condition (SBO), it should be equipped with a starting system - 
preferably multiple systems for redundancy - which are capable of performing the black 
start.  
To achieve even greater degree of reliability, the diversity principle should be ap-
plied to the design of the gas turbine starter system, meaning the starter systems should 
have different operating mechanisms. For example the initial start up of the gas turbine 
could be achieved with air turbines from a compressed air storage tank. The KTA 3702 
presents a similar solution for diesel engines, where compressed air is acted on the pis-
tons initially. Other options for initial power to the starter motor is using small diesel 
motor or even electrical motor powered by DC batteries.  
The required energy stored for the starter systems should be established by the pur-
chaser according to the safety requirements that regulations and the PRA of the unit 
demand. The KTA 3702 standard demands sufficient energy stored for the starting sys-
tem of the diesel engine for 3 complete starting sequences, but the purchaser of the nu-
clear unit may deem more safety margin is required here by probabilistic safety analy-
sis, for example. In this case, the requirement for start-up capacity was set for 9 com-
plete starts. 
To enable successive starts following a failure in the start-up sequence in the gas 
turbine, the engine must be purged from all excessive fuel accumulated in the engine. 
This is needed to prevent any damage resulting from the fuel combusting in wrong plac-
es such as in the first turbine stages. If allowed to happen, this process destroys the first 
stage nozzle blades of the turbine or damages other parts of the turbine. Boyce (2012) 
states that a flow of at least 5 times the total volume must go through the turbine to ex-
pel all fuel from it. 
5.3.2. Fuel and Lubrication 
The fuel and lubrication oil systems are of course vital for the gas turbine as dysfunction 
of either system prevents emergency operation of the gas turbine. As such, the require-
ments of the fuel and lubrication systems have to be well defined to meet the operation-
al requirement of the whole unit. 
Being the operating media of the gas turbine, both lubrication and fuel oil storage 
quantities define the maximum operating time of the gas turbine unless they are refilled. 
The nuclear unit purchaser, supplier and the nuclear authority have to evaluate the dura-
tion that the gas turbine has to be self-sufficient during the accident conditions assuming 
the operating media storages cannot be refilled. The required duration the emergency 
power is needed varies as different reactor designs may have very different safety solu-
tions. The alternative AC unit has to be able to perform the safety functions required 
from it in Design Extension Conditions (DEC) and Severe Accident (SA) as defined 
earlier and these conditions require that the engine is able to operate continuously for a 
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sufficient period of time until power is restored to the nuclear power unit from another 
source, preferably the national 400 kV power grid.  
Usually the emergency power units have a 24 hour operation fuel oil tanks located 
at the unit. Additionally the fuel storage tanks at the power plant site hold additional 
fuel that is transferred to the operating fuel tank by a pump if additional fuel is needed. 
In the KTA 3702 the requirement for the total quantity of fuel located at the plant site is 
set for 72 h operation but the purchaser may deem even more time, such as a week (168 
h) is required before the need for refilling the fuel reserve. The quantity of lubrication 
oil in the day tank should naturally correspond to the fuel quantity so that it will not 
become a bottle-neck for the operating time of 24 hours. To account for temperature 
differences, the operating tanks should be sized with sufficient expansion margin so that 
the oil expansion will not damage the tank. 
As a part of the fire protections of the AAC facility, the fuel and lubrication oil 
pipelines and connections should be placed in such ways that any possible leakages 
from them are prevented to come in contact with high-temperature surfaces of the en-
gine. This prevents fires and use of fire protection systems that could potentially inhibit 
the use of the gas turbine engine for emergency operation. 
The nuclear power plant site also presents in itself requirements for the lubrication 
and fuel systems as the ambient conditions, mainly temperature, greatly affect the prop-
erties of the oils. In cold climates the oil viscosity increases drastically meaning it be-
comes in essence thicker. The high viscosity of fuel and lubrication oil results in block-
ing of filters and difficulty of pumping so the engine may become deprived of fuel or 
lubrication, which necessitates shutdown of the engine. The cold weather conditions 
may also cause water contamination of the fuel as water condensates from the air inside 
the fuel tank and this has to be prevented. The solution for preventing this has been left 
to the designer. 
Cold filter plugging point (CFPP) is the lowest temperature that a diesel fuel oil 
passes through a standard filter and the acceptable value for the CFPP of the fuel the 
engine can operate with needs to be required by the purchaser. Cloud point of a fuel oil 
is another property related to low temperatures, where the wax in diesel oil starts to pre-
cipitate and form a "cloudy" appearance in the fuel. This wax then may plug filters and 
small holes and eventually prevent engine function.  
Applicable standards for the diesel oil used in the AAC unit are for example the BS 
CWA 15940:2009 and EN 590:2010, both of which cover the production and testing 
methods of the diesel fuel oils and contain the classification according to the CFPP and 
cloud point values of the fuels. Considering the installation site, which is in a climate 
zone with cold winter, the gas turbine engine should be able to operate on all fuels with 
CFPP and cloud points as low as the arctic grade (-44 ºC/-40 ºC). 
To prevent problems resulting from the cold weather conditions, both the lubrica-
tion and fuel oil systems should be equipped with pre-warming systems that keep the 
operating media temperatures at desirable level. During normal operation of the nuclear 
unit, the central heating system of the unit may be used for warming up the fuel and 
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lubrication oils. In emergency operation, the pre-warming systems could use the heat 
energy of the exhaust gases to maintain operation. 
Contaminants in the lubrication or fuel oil can quickly lead to damage in the engine 
as the performance of the lubrication oil degrades, when the contaminants change the 
characteristics of the oil, and the foreign materials in the fuel might affect the combustor 
or turbine of the engine. For this reason, requirements have to be specified for the filter-
ing that prevents contaminants entering the engine and damaging the engine compo-
nents or clogging up nozzles etc.  The filtering systems should be equipped with moni-
toring that indicates any arising clogging problems or other difficulties, so the nuclear 
unit operators can react to them beforehand. To maintain the quality of the fuel and lu-
brication oils, their condition should also be inspected regularly by sampling. The filter-
ing should include bypassing possibility so that they can be cleaned and exchanged even 
during operation of the unit.  
The filtering and oil quality requirements set in the specifications are similar to the 
KTA 3702 standard and other diesel requirements as the differences between the en-
gines regarding the fuel are not great. The consumption rates are slightly different with 
gas turbine using more fuel but requiring less lubrication oil affecting the storage re-
quirements slightly. 
5.3.3. Cooling 
The use of water and steam for cooling turbine blades are very efficient methods to 
lower the blade temperature and improve thermal efficiency but their advantages out-
weigh the disadvantages only in the base-load power generation, preferably in combined 
cycle power plant applications, where the steam from the waste-heat boiler of the sec-
ondary circuit can be used as a coolant.  
The more efficient and complicated cooling methods are mainly for engines that are 
optimized for efficiency and thus have high firing temperatures, which directly leads to 
higher turbine inlet temperatures. Following the same train of thought, the use of a gas 
turbine which runs on a thermodynamic cycle including regeneration/recuperation or 
inter-cooling is also largely impractical in the standby power source application of a gas 
turbine. As the emergency power unit, the thermal efficiency increase of the process 
cycle is not the focal point of the design, and the increased complexity only servers to 
hinder the reliability and availability of the engine.  
In the application discussed in this thesis, sufficient cooling of the turbine blades 
should be achievable by bleed air cooling which simplifies the engine and decreases the 
amount of components demanding maintenance operations. This also reduces the filter-
ing, monitoring and sampling equipment that would be needed for the quality control of 
the coolant similar to those of the fuel and lubrication oils. 
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5.3.4. Intake Air and Exhaust Gas 
The gas turbine requires atmospheric air for working fluid and expels it including the 
combustion products in the exhaust gases. The intake and exhaust systems are thus a 
vital part of the engine and some requirements need to be set for their design.   
The intake air system should be equipped with filtering system to prevent contami-
nants entering the engine. Clogging of the intake air should be monitored as the pressure 
loss increase in the intake filter directly decreases the power capacity of the engine as 
less air is drawn in to the engine. The intake air properties also directly affect the per-
formance of the gas turbine and constant monitoring of the thermal properties of the 
intake air is important.  
The cold weather climate of the installation site of the nuclear unit presents chal-
lenges to the design of the air intake duct and filter as the intake duct pressure losses 
drop the temperature by multiple degrees and may result in ice forming into the duct 
and the intake filter in right conditions. This could be potentially disastrous as the en-
gine would be deprived from the operating fluid and become unavailable. The potential 
need of an anti-icing system for the air intake should be carefully evaluated by the AAC 
facility designer and prove by analysis that the possibility of blocking of the intake air 
system can be deemed low. 
The gas exhaust system removes the exhaust gases from the AAC facility and is al-
so equipped with a silencer to reduce the noise generated by the gas turbine. One major 
concern is that the intake air system would draw back in the exhaust gases of the engine, 
which would deprive the engine of combustion air and potentially carry contaminants 
into the engine that could cause damage in the compressor or other parts of the engine. 
The problem should be mostly avoided with a simple solution, where the air intake and 
exhaust outlet are installed sufficiently far from each other. 
Gas turbine exhaust gases contain high amounts of heat energy that normally is ex-
pelled to the sky. The gas turbine exhaust system should be designed such that the waste 
heat can be collected and used to heat up the operating fuel tank of the gas turbine dur-
ing emergency operation. This provides added availability as the AAC unit is not reliant 
only on the central heating system of the nuclear unit in case of emergency during cold 
weather.  
5.3.5. Energy Supply for Auxiliaries 
Many of the auxiliary devices of the AAC facility such as pumps, blowers or actuation 
devices require electrical power to operate. In emergency operation of the unit, these 
systems and equipment are powered by the DC batteries that are allocated for them and 
located nearby the facility. 
The DC batteries should always have sufficient capacity for the unit to remain oper-
ational for a reasonable time, and the batteries should normally be charged by the en-
gine as it starts operating. The DC battery capacity requirement corresponds with the 
 61 
time requirements that the nuclear unit has to remain self-sufficient in accident condi-
tions such as DEC or SA. The time requirement for DC batteries is usually specified to 
be the same as DC battery capacity of other safety related DC systems in the nuclear 
unit, which means a capacity of 8 hours. 
5.4. Instrumentation and Control 
The control systems and all their instrumentation are naturally critical for the engine 
function and follow the same system and component classification requirements as oth-
er safety systems and components. The classification of the instrumentation and control 
(I&C) system is based on the nuclear regulations as presented in the YVL B.2 guide. 
The control systems of the AAC unit should have separate functions for emergency op-
eration (Safety Class 3) and periodic testing operation (Class EYT). According to re-
quirements of the YVL B.2, these separate control functions have to be designed in such 
way that the Class EYT equipment cannot cause failures in the Safety Class 3 functions.  
To achieve the reliability of control functions required by the regulations, the manu-
facturing, design and operation requirements of the I&C system are controlled by ap-
proved standards. For the Safety Class 3 I&C, the approved standards that are: IEC 
61508:2010 "Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems" and IEC 61513:2011 "Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and 
control important to safety - General requirements for systems" composed by the Inter-
national Electrotechnical Commission. Following these standards ensures that the I&C 
functions that are effective during emergency are based on technologies with proven 
reliability gained from operating experiences in nuclear power plants.  
The qualification testing of the I&C systems also has to be assessed by an accredit-
ed body with certifications such as EN 45011 "General requirements for bodies operat-
ing product certification systems" or ISO 17020 "Conformity assessment -- Require-
ments for the operation of various types of bodies performing inspection" and the type 
tests of the I&C equipment are to be performed by an organization approved according 
ISO 17025:2005 "General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration 
laboratories". 
The Class EYT non-safety-related control functions of the gas turbine engine effec-
tive during non-emergency operation may use more modern instrumentation, monitor-
ing and control concepts. The Class EYT system may thus be more sophisticated and 
give more accurate readings and in-depth information about the engine. On the other 
hand the Class EYT control functions they are not considered as reliable as the Safety 
Class 3 equipment and functions and the standards their designs follow are not as tightly 
controlled. The Class EYT control functions should follow the generally accepted 
standards used by the gas turbine industry in non-nuclear applications. 
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5.4.1. Functional Requirements for Control Systems 
Requirements for the functionality of the control systems cover the conditions where the 
gas turbine is started up and how it is operated. As defined earlier, the safety function of 
the AAC facility is to provide AC power to the dedicated safety equipment required for 
DEC and SA conditions, where the main EDGs fail to function. The switch-over from 
the Class EYT to the Safety Class 3 functions should be automatic when the nuclear 
unit electrical systems lose connection to the outside AC source. 
Depending on the design of the reactor safety functions required in DEC and SA 
conditions, the start-up time requirement of the AAC gas turbine varies from immediate 
up to a few hours. The start-up of the engine can be either automatic following the fail-
ure of main EDGs or manually activated by an operator from either the main control 
room (MCR), emergency control room (ECR), or the local control room (LCR). The 
start-up of the engine in any other conditions should be prevented by the I&C system so 
that it cannot cause any failures in other safety equipment. The authorization for the use 
of the LCR is ensured by a high-quality locking system, so that the operation is possible 
only with an authorization key. The LCR is normally used for testing the gas turbine 
periodically so the operators in the MCR can concentrate on the nuclear unit handling. 
The MCR operators should still be able to supervise and control the AAC unit during 
manual operation from the LCR. 
To make the manual start-up of the unit feasible under stressful conditions, the ac-
tions required from the operator in the manual start-up sequence of the engine should be 
limited, and the rest of the operations should be automatic. The I&C systems should 
also give sufficiently detailed feedback to the operator during the start-up on the pro-
gress and completion of commands so any abnormalities can be observed.  
After the gas turbine has been started up, the and power loading and operation of 
the unit should require no manual operator actions for 30 minutes, which is a general 
requirement for consideration time for the operators in a nuclear unit. This requirement 
ensures that the operator has sufficient time to think and react to the accident conditions. 
The control functions should be designed with minimal potential for human error. 
Shutdown of the engine should normally only be initiated by a manual operation, 
after the connection to an off-site AC source is restored by the nuclear unit electrical 
systems. Engine protective shutdown signals are of course a separate case and will be 
discussed in Chapter 5.4.3. While not normal operation condition of the AAC gas tur-
bine generator, it should also be able to be synchronized to the external power grid with 
good reliability without losing power in the emergency power trains. 
5.4.2. Performance and Condition Monitoring 
Gas turbines are equipped with a performance and condition monitoring system which 
normally controls the operation of the engine and also shows any process fluctuations to 
the operator so he can react to them accordingly. The monitoring system also notices if 
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the performance of the engine or the generator is somehow decreasing. Identifying the 
sources of performance drops in advance is important so that no unexpected loss of per-
formance can occur while in emergency operation of the engine.  
The gas turbine and generator performance and condition monitoring is important for 
the AAC unit safety function, as any gradual wearing in the different component mate-
rials can lead to sudden failures further causing performance issues or even complete 
unavailability of the engine if the damage is severe enough. According to Boyce (2012) 
condition monitoring systems have become more and more part of the gas turbine de-
signs as a proactive maintenance method that gives early warning of problems instead 
of fixing the engine only after failures have already occurred. Condition monitoring 
systems are important from both the cost and safety point-of-views, as increased availa-
bility of the engine is desirable in every application.  
Vibration measurements are one of the most important aspects of the condition moni-
toring as any changes in the vibration conditions can quickly lead to component damage 
due to friction or cyclic stress forces. Vibration measurement device are usually placed 
to measure either the shaft or the bearings that provide damping against the vibrations. 
The maximum displacement of the bearings and the shaft are usually the limiting 
measures used by standards against vibrations as they depict the amplitude of the vibra-
tion. 
Common examples of monitored process values are: rotation speed, bearing and 
shaft vibrations, exhaust gas temperature, pressures at different stages of the engine, 
pressure differentials in filters, operating media temperatures and pressures. The electri-
cal performance of the generator is also monitored. Examples of monitored values of the 
generator are: rotation speed, active power, voltage and frequency. The final scope of 
the monitored values is dependent on the gas turbine type and thus left to the supplier.  
5.4.3. Engine and Generator Protection 
A gas turbine engine and the generator must have sufficient protective equipment initi-
ating immediate shutdown procedures of the engine if any protective limit values are 
exceeded. Two separate limit values are normally set for the protective measurements: 
lower limits issues warning for the operator while the higher value initiates shutdown of 
the engine, which is often called "tripping" the engine. The safety-critical engine protec-
tion system uses the monitoring systems of the gas turbines but may be independent of 
them to ensure the protective shutdown if needed. 
The engine protective functions should also be split into two separate groups ac-
cording to the Safety Classification in YVL B.2 guide as with the rest of the I&C sys-
tems. The nuclear safety overrides the engine condition-preserving protections so only 
those protective systems for signals which would lead quickly, directly to the destruc-
tion of the engine should remain functional during emergency power operation of the 
gas turbine. The protective equipment effective during emergency operation are classi-
fied as Safety Class 3 and the equipment protecting the engine during periodic operation 
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are classified as Class EYT. The Class EYT protective equipment include more exten-
sive collection of tripping as their goal is to prolong the life-time of the engine instead 
of nuclear safety. During emergency operation of the AAC unit, the Class EYT protec-
tive alarms signals should be displayed to the operators, and warn of impending prob-
lems even if shutdown is not initiated.  
To ensure the safety functions are performed, the protective equipment effective 
during emergency operation (Safety Class 3) should be designed with redundancy to 
ensure high reliability. Also a preferred design option is that the shutdown is only initi-
ated if multiple separate signals are received. This prevents erroneous signals resulting 
from faults in the instruments of shutting down the engine. During testing operations, 
preserving the engine condition is more important, and so only 1 shutdown signal is 
required from the Class EYT equipment. The source of the problem should be then 
identified and possible faulty instrumentation replaced. If the engine shutdown is initiat-
ed by Class EYT protections, the operators should be able to intervene. On the other 
hand, if the Safety Class 3 equipment initiate shutdown, the operators should have no 
possibility to stop the sequence. This measure is taken to ensure operator error may not 
cause destruction of the engine or cause damage to the AAC facility or the nuclear unit. 
The normal mechanical values used by the protective device of the gas turbine gen-
erator include for example high rotational speed of the shaft, pressure loss in the lubri-
cation system, compressor surge signs, high exhaust gas temperature, excessive bearing 
vibration and temperatures. The generator electrical performance that can initiate shut-
down include for example: generator differential, reverse power, over-current and exci-
tation failure. The final scope of the alarms and tripping values are decided by the gas 
turbine supplier but the choices need to be well analyzed and justified. 
5.4.4. AAC Unit Facility Protections 
In addition to the mechanical protections in the gas turbine and generator, the AAC fa-
cility has protections for unit internal events such as fires that could prevent its opera-
tion in emergency conditions. Other protections that the facility requires are for the ex-
ternal events such as floods, earthquakes or storms. The facility protections must ensure 
the AAC unit stays operational after these events. 
The fire protections of the unit should be designed in such way that their operation 
should not lead to long unavailability of the engine. If wet fire protections (such as 
sprinklers) are used, the mechanical and electrical components inside the facility must 
be sufficiently protected, so that the AAC unit may be operated after the fire has been 
extinguished without major maintenance operations. If the fire protection system is in-
stead based on inert gas protections, the facility has to be equipped with alarming device 
to warn any personnel before they are activated as they deprive oxygen from the facility 
which is possibly lethal for any personnel remaining inside. 
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5.5. Gas Turbine Testing 
Testing of the gas turbine is important to ensure it functions as intended according to the 
specified requirements throughout the whole operating range in the worst possible con-
ditions. Suitability and compliance with the requirements must first be confirmed and 
afterwards the operating condition must be maintained and inspected throughout the 
intended service life-time of the engine.  
The important tests performed at different stages of delivery include: qualification 
type test, production test, commissioning test and finally periodic functional testing. The 
most important one of these considering the scope of this thesis is the qualification type 
test. All testing prior to the handover of the complete nuclear unit to the nuclear licensee 
is done by the supplier or its subcontractors. An important part of the quality control is 
that the nuclear authority STUK is permitted to attend these tests upon request to make 
sure they are done according to approved methods. 
5.5.1. Qualification Type Tests 
The gas turbine engine type intended to be used as an emergency power supply of a 
nuclear unit must subjected to a type test, where its performance regarding startup times 
and startup reliability, power rating, continuous operating stability and power loading 
capabilities are proven to be as designed. The gas turbine engine is tested on a test bed 
that simulates the auxiliaries that are not integral to the engine. The main auxiliary sys-
tems connected to the engine and naturally the gas turbine itself should be the same that 
are intended to be used in the actual final AAC facility at the installation site.  
The type test is a first step for a gas turbine to be accepted for the application and as 
such should be the most rigorous of the tests and include a combination of all the harsh-
est conditions (ambient pressure/temperature) that are possible at the installation site. 
The engine is run with cyclic loads as well as continuous power operation to cover all 
operating modes. To achieve high reliability, the guidelines of the CS-E standard for 
aircraft engine type approval are used develop the type test program. The type test pro-
gram includes testing the capability of the starter systems to start up the engine from 
SBO and also includes multiple hot starts, where the engine is only just shutdown and 
also sufficient amount of cold starts. Important feature tested in the type test is also the 
capability of recovering from a failed start and establishing the duration it takes to drain 
excess fuel and restart the engine. 
The power test portion of the engine type test includes at least a 100 hours of con-
tinuous operation which includes shorter periods running on partial loads (25%, 50 %, 
75%) to ensure the operation stays stable throughout complete operating range. Also the 
overloading capability of the engine must be verified with running the engine on 110% 
rated power for at least the required 1 hour. To simulate sudden power load drops and 
connections, the engine should also be tested with rapidly changing power loads be-
tween maximum power and partial loads. 
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The maximum number of malfunctions allowed during the test run and the time to 
re-establish the stable operating of the engine are things that need to be specified. The 
KTA 3702:2000 standard requires the diesel engine to be unavailable no more than 20 
minutes during the whole type test run. Malfunctions caused by external reasons or 
problems from the test bed are of course exempted from the unavailability time consid-
eration, however, all malfunctions still need to be well documented by the tester for the 
engine to achieve approval. The CS-E standard (CS-E 740 (b) (1)) for aircraft engine 
type approval also states that any interrupted testing stages must be repeated unless con-
sidered unnecessary. Additionally the complete test may be required to be repeated if 
the interruptions become excessive. 
The type test is considered successful if the gas turbine performance fulfils the re-
quirements concerning output power and stays within given tolerance operating values. 
The engine is also inspected thoroughly by disassembling it and made sure that no signs 
of wear or damage are found in any engine components. The nuclear authority STUK 
assesses the type test records and documentation and decides whether the engine can be 
classified as Safety Class 3 equipment as intended and be used as an emergency power 
unit for DEC and SA. 
5.5.2. Production Tests 
After a successful qualification type test, the gas turbine type may be utilized as a Safety 
Class 3 device. Production test is a part of the normal quality assurance program re-
quired from all safety equipment. The goal is to make sure all the components are man-
ufactured with high quality and perform as intended and shown also by the type test.  
The production tests have to be extended on all the safety-critical auxiliary compo-
nents of the engine to make sure the complete package can be accepted and installed. In 
the production test of the engine, the performance of and compliance with tolerance 
requirements are once again verified and documented. 
Achieving the desired operating reliability for the whole AAC unit begins from the 
design and production of each individual component of the engine and the auxiliary 
systems. The design and manufacturing of all components and systems should be done 
by organizations with certified quality management programs as required by the YVL 
regulations. This ensures that the components and systems can be trusted to function in 
their intended function for the designed life-time.  
5.5.3. Commissioning Tests 
Commissioning tests are performed on the complete alternative AC unit, which the gas 
turbine engine is a part of, before the handover of the nuclear unit from the supplier to 
the purchaser. In the commissioning tests the final proof of functioning of the gas tur-
bine and all the components and systems that perform the safety function are tested. The 
complete scope of the commissioning test is decided between the supplier and the pur-
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chaser of the nuclear unit according to the commissioning plan of the whole nuclear unit 
and becomes more relevant in later stages. Only the basic scope of the commissioning 
acceptance test is discussed in the requirements specifications developed in this thesis. 
Tests that could be included in the commissioning tests for example are: starting up 
the engine without external power with the starting systems to prove their function, 
loading up the generator according to the emergency power load sequencing program 
and meeting the possible requirements of load acceptance times and variations in the 
output. The commissioning tests should be sufficiently long to establish that the engine 
truly performs continuously as intended at the final installation site. The difference to 
earlier tests is that the AAC facility is connected to the complete nuclear unit I&C sys-
tems, so the functions of the complete safety trains such as automatic start-up signaling 
by reactor protective signals may be tested in the commissioning phase. 
5.5.4. Periodic Tests 
Testing of the gas turbine engine and the emergency power generating facility at the 
nuclear power plant site is conducted regularly in order to ensure that the facility is 
functional and operates as intended. The functional test run is especially important after 
unavailability of the engine resulting from maintenance operations and especially after a 
failure of the gas turbine. 
The periodic tests are scheduled together with other emergency power facilities so 
that others remain functional as one is tested. Normally a nuclear unit has two AAC 
sources and 4 main emergency sources if the N+1 and N+2 Criteria, as specified earli-
er, are applied to them. The independent Class 3 AAC units should be tested separately 
and also with sufficient main emergency power sources available for operation. 
The testing interval of the AAC units must be specified by the purchaser of the nu-
clear unit according to the nuclear unit's safety assessment. Similarly to the main emer-
gency diesel generators, normal interval for the test is once per month per engine, which 
means every 2 weeks one of the AAC facilities is tested. The startup of the gas turbine 
in periodic tests should normally be manually activated but at least once a year, the test 
should be performed by realistic signal. Also the overload capacity of the gas turbine 
must be tested at least once a year to verify it. 
The periodic testing programs may, in addition to just testing the function of the en-
gine, include testing of the control systems by initiating the emergency startup of the 
gas turbine or shutdown by tripping the engine protection signals. Most of the times the 
startup and shutdown sequences used in the periodic tests should be slow, however, as 
this significantly extends the life-time of the components that are subject to wear or ag-
ing. The Class EYT protective signals, as earlier described, are effective during the pe-
riodic testing of the AAC unit. Results of the function test run are recorded so the per-
formance can be compared to earlier tests and the designed performance characteristics.  
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5.5.5. Inspections on the Operating Media 
To maintain the quality of the fuel oil, lubrication oil and possible coolants, they must 
be inspected periodically. The quality of the fuel to be used in the engine must always 
be tested and inspected before they are used to refill the storage tank. Additionally the 
fuel inside the storage tank should be tested at least in yearly intervals. To achieve suffi-
ciently representative samples, the fuel storage tank must be equipped with a mixer and 
a sampling line. The fuel is tested for viscosity, filterability, water content and other 
critical properties. If the quality of the fuel is in some way degraded, the fuel should be 
replaced. 
The quality of the lubrication oil used by the engine is also very critical as any con-
taminants will quickly damage the engine or block filters. The lubrication oil is also 
tested by taking samples with sufficient intervals determined by the engine supplier. 
Normally the oil should be sampled after the periodic function test runs of the engine to 
determine if its quality is somehow changed. 
5.6. Maintenance Requirements 
The requirements for the maintenance operations are specified as part of the procure-
ment process and the main driving goal for these requirements is to maintain the func-
tion of the engine throughout the intended service life-time. The supplier of the unit 
develops a maintenance schedule and detailed guide how to perform the maintenance 
operations for the gas turbine according to the safety analysis of the AAC unit and as 
part of the complete nuclear unit maintenance concept. The maintenance guide supplied 
with the unit includes specific maintenance schedule that takes into account the testing 
schedules of other emergency power sources so enough of them remains available for 
emergency operation.  
The maintenance documents provided by the supplier need to be comprehensive to 
give the nuclear unit operator capability to perform the required maintenance operations 
on-site with their own personnel. The guide should also give sufficient information 
about the critical spare parts that are needed at the plant site and their replacement 
schedules so long times of unavailability are avoided.  
5.7. Documentation Requirements 
Documentation on the AAC facility provided by the supplier is extremely important in 
the licensing process of a nuclear power plant as it proves that the design concept fol-
lows the requirements of the nuclear regulations and those that are set by the power 
plant purchaser. The procurement of the complete nuclear unit is a long project and in-
cludes many stages, each including various documentation regarding the designs or test-
ing protocols and certifications that need to be submitted by the supplier for review by 
the nuclear authority and the power unit purchaser. 
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The AAC unit and the gas turbine are a part of the electrical system of the complete 
nuclear unit and form a group of safety classified equipment according to the YVL B.2 
draft 4 as specified earlier. The requirements specification document demands that the 
design, fabrication, assembly, maintenance, I&C and testability are ensured with de-
tailed analysis and testing by accredited bodies. The documentation of these analyses 
and tests are the proof that is submitted for review to the power plant owner and the 
nuclear authority, which eventually grants the operating license. The required documen-
tation requirements are split for separate systems so that the following systems are cov-
ered: AAC facility, gas turbine generator, auxiliary systems, I&C system, testing proto-
cols and operation & maintenance.  
The documentation provided of the AAC facility should include a general arrange-
ment drawing of the facility, electrical circuit drawings, component certificates, piping 
and cabling routing. Additionally the documentation should include analysis of the pro-
tections of the facility from internal and external events such as fires, earthquakes and 
floods. Important quality to prove to fulfil the redundancy principle is the physical and 
functional separation of the AAC facility from the other AAC sources. The I&C docu-
mentation should include detailed analysis of the system boundaries and separation of 
the control functions during emergency and periodic testing operation.  
The documents regarding the gas turbine generator unit should include detailed 
analysis of performance in different ambient conditions that can be encountered at the 
installation site and proof that surge and choke conditions are avoided. Also the vibra-
tion analysis of the engine should be sufficiently documented so the operators can 
properly avoid the operating speeds causing destructive vibration conditions. The relia-
bility and availability analyses of the gas turbine should also be well documented. Doc-
umentation on the testing procedures for the gas turbine is one of the most important 
parts in the qualification process for safety classification so much emphasis should be 
put into it. 
Operation and maintenance documentation should include detailed guides how the 
engine is operated in different conditions and how the maintenance operations are per-
formed. The maintenance guide should include lists of critical parts that need to be 
stored at the plant site so the engine is kept available as much as possible. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The licensed use of nuclear power plants in Finland is regulated by legislation that de-
fines the general principles that need to be followed in the design and operation of the 
plant. More detailed technical requirements are set by the nuclear regulations called 
YVL guides and they define the safety system and equipment classification criteria ac-
cording to their safety function. Achieving the Safety Classification for mechanical and 
electrical equipment requires applying approved standards to the design and qualifica-
tion testing process. 
The application of alternative AC source for power supply in accident conditions 
requires the gas turbine engine to be classified as Safety Class 3. The research problem 
was that there is no nuclear standard, Finnish or international, that covers the design and 
testing of a gas turbine engine for the application. The objective of this thesis research 
was to specify the requirements for the design and testing procedure for a gas turbine 
intended to be used as nuclear safety equipment. The goal was approached by construct-
ing the requirements specifications document using different standards so that the gas 
turbine would have sufficient reliability and availability to achieve qualification. 
The gas turbine is a flexible engine type suited for many different applications and 
wide range of power rating. The high-power-rating engines are used as base-load plants 
in combined cycle processes and smaller gas turbines are excellent for producing peak-
ing power. The gas turbine industry is generally concerned about the increased costs 
caused by an inefficient engine or the NOx emissions generated by the engine. This 
means that most research focus is put into the improvements of efficiency by increasing 
turbine inlet temperatures and compressor pressure ratios and reducing emission by 
modifying the combustor. Even though major improvements have been in these fields, 
they have come with the price of reduced reliability and availability. The safety applica-
tion of the gas turbine requires much less power and the efficiency of the engine is rela-
tively irrelevant, instead striving for a wide operating range with stable operation in all 
conditions. 
The requirements specifications developed in this study cover the AAC facility lay-
out, the gas turbine, the instrumentation and control, the auxiliary systems, operation 
and maintenance, testing and inspections and the documentation. Most of these re-
quirements are very similar to emergency power generating facilities using diesel gen-
erators and can be incorporated from the KTA 3702:2000 standard; the main difference 
is the actual gas turbine and its specific auxiliary systems. Special consideration in the 
requirements was put into the performance of the engine and the supporting systems in 
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the wide range of ambient temperatures present at the installation site of Olkiluoto, Fin-
land. 
The qualification of the instrumentation and control systems for Safety Class 3 re-
quires using proven components with redundancy, diversity and separation. This chal-
lenges the gas turbine designer to modify the control systems logic so that the system 
generally used by the gas turbine in other applications is used as Class EYT during the 
periodic testing procedures, and separate control functions are active during emergency 
situations. The difference between the control functions is that during emergency, the 
main focus is performing the safety function for the required duration, while during pe-
riodic testing additional engine protections may be active to better preserve the engine 
condition. 
Gas turbine engines are widely used in aircrafts and their reliability requirements 
and testing procedures to achieve airworthiness certification are extremely strict. Simi-
lar reliability for the gas turbine is needed for the safety qualification, so the testing pro-
cedures of the aircraft engine were adapted to the emergency power gas turbine type test 
program. The certification type test includes starting up the engine multiple times from 
different conditions and running the engine continuously on various loads in a wide 
range and verifying that the requirements are met regarding the operating tolerance val-
ues throughout the test. 
The hardest part of the gas turbine qualification process is actually still ahead as no 
gas turbine engine has been used as nuclear safety classified equipment. Following the 
design and testing requirements specified as part of this study, I believe that a gas tur-
bine engine type can achieve qualification to be used as Safety Class 3 power source in 
a Finnish nuclear power plant. 
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APPENDIX A: FAILURE DIAGNOSTICS 
 
Table A-1: Compressor Diagnostics (Boyce 2012) 
 ηc π T2/T1  ̇ Vibration TBearing PBearing Pbleed chamber 
Clogged Filter - ↑ - ↓ - - - - 
Surge ↑ ↑↓ - ↓ - ↑ ↑ ↑↓ 
Fouling ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ - - - 
Damaged blade ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ - - ↑↓ 
Bearing failure -  -  ↑ ↑ ↓ - 
 
Table A-2: Combustor Diagnostics (Boyce 2012) 
 Pfuel Unevenness of 
combustion 
Exhaust 
tempera-
ture spread 
Exhaust 
tempera-
ture 
Clogging ↑ ↑  ↑ 
Fouling ↑ or ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Crossover tube failure ↑ or ↓ - ↑+ - 
Detached or cracked liner ↑ or ↓ ↑ ↑ - 
 
Table A-3: Turbine Diagnostics (Boyce 2012) 
 ηc π T3/T4 Vibration TBearing Pcooling air Twheel 
space 
PBearing 
Fouling ↓ - ↓ ↑ - - ↑ - 
Damaged blade ↓ - ↓ ↑ - - - - 
Bowed nozzle ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ - - ↑ - 
Bearing failure - - - ↑ ↑ - - ↓ 
Cooling air fail-
ure 
- - - - ↑ ↓ ↑ - 
 
